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Abstract
William Faulkner’s novel Absalom, Absalom! mediates the persistence of the violent history of
the US South in the present and grapples with the difficulty of narrating and wresting meaning
from it. This violence is embodied by Thomas Sutpen, a man who installs himself as planter and
patriarch in the antebellum South, and whose narrative trajectory and fate the various narrators
attempt to reconstruct. A peculiar anachronism appears in their attempt, however: in the 1820s,
Sutpen begins his rise by suppressing a revolution of the enslaved in Haiti. The existence of
slavery in Haiti at this historical juncture implies that the Haitian Revolution had not yet
happened, and that Sutpen himself is capable of stopping it. Rather than pass over this
contradiction between narrative and history as a relatively insignificant error, I center and
theorize it as constitutive of Absalom, Absalom! as a whole. In doing so, I arrive at the
significance the Haitian Revolution holds for the novel and for universal history as an eruption
of Black radicality that tokens temporal rupture, concentration of totality, and dialectical
process.

Dedication
“The Haitian Revolution thus entered history with the peculiar characteristic of being
unthinkable even as it happened.”
-

Michel-Rolph Trouillot

“In a revolution, when the ceaseless slow accumulation of centuries bursts into volcanic
eruption, the meteoric flares and flights above are a meaningless chaos and lend themselves to
infinite caprice and romanticism unless the observer sees them always as projections of the subsoil from which they came.”
-

C. L. R. James

“a soil manured with black blood from two hundred years of oppression and exploitation . . .
the yet intact bones and brains in which the old unsleeping blood that had vanished into the
earth they trod still cried out for vengeance.”
-

William Faulkner

“The past carries with it a temporal index by which it is referred to redemption.”
-

Walter Benjamin
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Introduction
On August 28, 1955, a Black child named Emmett Till was lynched for allegedly whistling at a
white woman in Money, Mississippi. About eighty miles to the northeast, in Oxford,
Mississippi, shortly after hearing that Till’s body had been found, William Faulkner wrote a
letter to the New York Herald Tribune “in which he said that a society so desperate as to murder
children didn’t ‘deserve to survive, and probably won’t’” (qtd. in Gorra 347-8). Faulkner’s
comments on racism and the civil rights movement fall within a spectrum which encompasses
the tentatively progressive and outright reactionary—the latter tendency is epitomized by a
statement which he drunkenly made in a Sunday Times interview in February 1956, less than
half a year after the Till letter: “if it came to fighting I’d fight for Mississippi against the United
States even if it meant going out into the street and shooting Negroes” (“Interview” 261).
Faulkner would spend much of his remaining years attempting to atone for that statement. That
same spring, W. E. B. Du Bois challenged Faulkner to a debate on civil rights. The proposed
debate would be held on the steps of the Mississippi courthouse where Emmett Till’s murderers
had been acquitted. Du Bois was by thirty years Faulkner’s senior, but even at eighty-eight he
was still more politically active than Faulkner had ever been. Faulkner declined the invitation,
claiming in a telegram to Du Bois: “I do not believe there is a debatable point between us. We
both agree in advance that the position you take is right morally, legally, and ethically . . . [if
recent tragedies like Emmett Till’s lynching] are not evidence to you that the position I take in
1

asking for moderation and patience is right practically, then we will both waste our breath”
(“Notes”). Beyond the moral cowardice of Faulkner’s gradualism, it is also highly unlikely that
he would have fared well in a debate with Du Bois—and he probably recognized this. Du Bois
was a veteran speaker and debater, and he had famously eviscerated the scientific racism of
historian Lothrop Stoddard in a 1929 debate. The archive of Du Bois’s collected papers shows
that Du Bois received Faulkner’s telegram, turned the paper upside down, and typed a response
which he never sent: “Moderation can only exist when there is action. Moderation with no
forward movement is surrender. Moderation with murder of the innocent is retreat” (“Notes”).
Though he never received this message, perhaps Faulkner also recognized that Du Bois’s
position was closer to the truth of the matter.1
The contradictory views on race that Faulkner held personally were inevitably informed
by the interventions of Du Bois and other Black historians and political activists like C. L. R.
James, even if he never read their work. Du Bois and James both challenged the historical
narratives of racism and raciality that culminated in what was often referred to as the “Negro
problem,” and they each contributed to this debate to great extent. In his personal life, Faulkner
often shied away from this discussion while tending to view Black people as incomprehensible,
if not problematic. Moreover, the capacity of Black people to resist racist subjection and to

For an excellent historical analysis of the Du Bois-Faulkner debate that never happened, see: Moreland, Richard
C. “Forward Movement: William Faulkner’s ‘Letter to the North,’ W. E. B. Du Bois’s Challenge, and The Reivers.”
The Faulkner Journal, vol. 30 no. 1, 2016, pp. 79-104.
1
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determine their own history confounded him. As Edouard Glissant writes, Faulkner’s Black
characters function as “keepers of the suffering, guardians of the temple of the unspeakable, but
not . . . an oppressed population that has the simple right to rise up against oppression” (94). In
short, Black revolution is absolutely unthinkable for Faulkner.
Nevertheless, in his fiction Faulkner often managed to see through—not past or
around—his own warped perceptions into the racialized violence and inequality at the heart of
the South. His own ambivalence toward the South allows this space to appear mediated in the
work as, more often than not, a society crumbling under the weight of its constitutive
contradictions. The contradiction between Faulkner’s melancholy humanism (in fiction) and
casual racism (in personal life) may then be read as that which constituted his own grappling
with the open question of “Southern” identity— an implicit task which many critics ascribe to
his work. It thus seems fitting that, out of all of Faulkner’s works, Absalom, Absalom! is the one
most endlessly studied and debated by its readers and critics—it is a tortuous maze of a novel,
the circuitous form of which illustrates the narrative difficulties concomitant with reaching into
the South’s past (or any past) to make it signify. Absalom was published in 1936, one year after
Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction in America and two years before James’s The Black Jacobins, two
historical studies of the self-emancipation of the Black enslaved: Du Bois studied the US Civil
War and its aftermath, while James examined the Haitian Revolution. In Faulkner’s novel, amid
all the recursive and verbose narrative attempts, the foundation of antebellum Southern society
ultimately proves to be the continuous suppression of a slave revolution, even though none of
3

its narrators seem to realize this.2 Instead, they fixate on the forms which pervade such a society
and direct the outsized ambitions of the ruthless Thomas Sutpen in his “design” to establish a
dynasty: the color line and the “absolute caste system” of the South (AA 276).
In contrast to Faulkner’s own steady middle-class status, Sutpen is a social climber who
arrives in Jefferson, Mississippi and acquires land on which he establishes a lucrative plantation.
Sutpen’s appearance in Jefferson is like that of a sudden apparition—no one knows anything
about his past, nor his class origins. As a somewhat mythical figure, Sutpen embodies to absurd
proportions the antebellum planter’s ideological fixations on bloodline, whiteness, and
sovereignty in relation to the brutal exploitation of the enslaved on whose labor and Blackness
the whole enterprise rests. Moreover, the contradiction between the “absolute caste” of
plantation aristocracy and Sutpen’s admission into this class discloses a contingency which in
turn contradicts the aforementioned ideology of purity and filiation. The material and
ideological violences and contradictions of the Southern plantation converge in Sutpen—and it
is the gestalt of this history which haunts the attempts to narrate it.
There are four intermingled primary narrative attempts in the novel: Rosa Coldfield’s
and Mr. Compson’s during separate hours of a Mississippi afternoon in September 1909, and
Quentin Compson’s and Shreve McCannon’s in a freezing Harvard dorm room in January,

One might also argue that the postbellum South structures itself to perpetuate the racist ideology and material
exploitation of Black people so that the relations of slavery remain as intact as possible—Saidiya Hartman’s phrase
“the afterlife of slavery” comes to mind.
2
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1910. All of them try to compile, construct, and make sense of the rise and fall of Sutpen insofar
as it might serve as an allegory for the rise and fall of the South. However, what is absent within
the narrative of Sutpen determines its significance even more than the narrators’ futile attempts
to wrestle meaning from it; indeed, this is what determines the futility of these attempts in the
first place.
When he arrives in Jefferson with intentions to establish a massive plantation, Sutpen
brings enslaved people from Haiti, people who are referred to repeatedly in the novel as his “wild
Negroes” or “wild n—s.”3 Sutpen’s experience as the overseer of a plantation in Haiti thus
determines his ability to become a planter in Mississippi, and to thereby establish a dynasty: it is
in Haiti that he gains control over and realizes the potential of enslaved labor. The former event
is dramatized within the novel as a suppression of a slave revolution. Therefore, within the
simple declarative statement “he went out and subdued them” lies one of the most famous
interpretative problems set by Absalom, Absalom!: how does Sutpen’s suppression of a slave
revolution in 1820s Haiti signify? Haiti, the only country in the world to have been established
through a successful revolution of the enslaved (concluded in 1804), should ostensibly be
unavailable for Sutpen to work as an overseer of enslaved African workers. It seems here that the

I have made the decision to censor the n-word when quoting from the primary text based on a consideration of
the incredible trauma which this signifer may evoke for readers and which it certainly recalls in history. I have also
chosen to follow Laurent Dubois’s preference for the term “people of color” over the two terms “mulattoes” or
“mixed-race people.” This is because the former is historically limited to a combination of European and African
ancestry that was not always the case, while the latter implies the possibility of unmixed or “pure” race (Avengers
6).
3
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novel submerges historical record in white imperial fantasy: Sutpen single-handedly suppresses
a slave uprising in Haiti at a time in history when slavery would already have been abolished
through the emancipatory success of the Haitian Revolution. It has often been pointed out that
Absalom was published only two years after the official end to the US imperialist occupation of
Haiti (1915-1934), the common implication being that the Haitian resistance to a US Marines,
many of whom came from the South, allowed Faulkner to immerse his narrative in an
ideological Haiti relevant to the US as a colonial theater where the contradictions of racism
could be objectivized.4 Thus, while engaging with the criticism that has long toiled to explain
the implications of Absalom’s Haiti, especially in connection with the contradiction between
Faulkner’s personal and artistic engagements with racism and raciality, I want to work through
the historical contexts to further explore the theoretical fecundity of this problem.
That no literary critic even noticed the problem until the 1990s is a shameful indictment
of US academia and its ignorance of world history, especially that of the Global South.5 As John
T. Matthews writes: “It is sobering to acknowledge how assumptions of US exceptionalism,
imperial indifference to prenational colonial origins, the peculiarization of the slaveholding
South by the rest of the country, and other forms of self-conceptual insularity carried over into
the neglect of what Faulkner’s South shares more broadly with new-world histories and

4

See Mary Renda’s Taking Haiti and my discussion of the occupation in Chapter 2 pp. 44-47.

The anachronism was first noted, albeit very briefly, in Hortense J. Spillers’ 1991 essay “Who Cuts the Border?:
Some Readings on ‘America.’ Black, White, and in Color. University of Chicago Press, 2003, pp. 319-335.
5
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experiences” (“Recalling” 239). Up to now, critics have been primarily interested in admitting
the anachronism’s ambiguity, but trying to find a straightforward explanation for the problem
anyway. To paraphrase some examples: Matthews sees it not as an anachronism, but an actual
historical possibility; Richard Godden views it as a conscious mistake with implicit
revolutionary potential; Wanda Raiford decries it as a reactionary impulse that implicates the
reader in Faulkner’s “white imperial innocence”; and Michael Kreyling dismisses it as purely
symbolic of an ideological Haiti available in a concrete historical instance.6 These readings
particularize and close off interpretation of this problem as just another part of Sutpen’s plot or
as a fascinatingly ambiguous part of the novel, rather than pursue it as an open question or
contradiction constitutive of Sutpen’s story and the novel as a whole. To work through this
contradiction, it is imperative to historicize it dialectically, so that through the gaps in the text
history might speak. Doing so must inevitably also attend to the material conditions mediated
in the novel and relate the shifts within distinct modes of production, especially as they relate to
the text’s immanent contradictions.7 It is here that the historical materialism of James and Du
Bois is especially invaluable—the work of both reads against the grain of historicism to excavate

For these readings, see: Godden, Richard, “Absalom, Absalom!, Haiti and Labor History: Reading Unreadable
Revolutions”; Matthews, John T., “Recalling the West Indies: From Yoknapatawpha to Haiti and Back”; Raiford,
Wanda, “Fantasy and Haiti’s Erasure in William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!.”; Kreyling, Michael, The South
That Wasn’t There: Postsouthern Memory and History.
6

I borrow this phrase from Benita Parry’s reading of the contradictory engagement with imperialism in Joseph
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, a reading which anticipates in many ways how Absalom, Absalom! depicts the
imperialized space of Haiti. For more, see Chapter 2, pp. 42-43.
7
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the actuality of Black revolutionary agency, that which the novel represses. Furthermore,
positing the Haitian Revolution specifically as the repressed negativity within the narrative
allows for an investigation of the singular theory of narration and historiography that Faulkner’s
novel comprises.
I therefore examine the Haitian Revolution as the absent center of the Sutpen plot,
which itself constitutes the incomplete object of narrative construction and storytelling in the
novel. By taking this as a problem immanent to the narrative, I find it necessary to interrogate
the dialectic between space and time through which history arrives as narrative synthesis. Thus,
I proceed through the problem in three chapters which mirror this movement and its relation
to the historical and ideological implications of the absence itself: Chapter 1 views the problem
in terms of time and revolution, Chapter 2 through space and imperialism, and Chapter 3 by
way of narrative and language. Reading dialectically between Absalom’s depiction of Haiti and
the historical Haitian Revolution also establishes understandings of the latter in terms of how
its repression pervades the novel’s form and content. Accordingly, a theoretical understanding
of the Haitian Revolution emerges which grasps its formal status in history as a temporal
rupture, concentration of totality, and dialectical process.

8

1

‘what he rode upon was a volcano’: Time and Revolution

William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! is a novel about failure. As Aliyyah Abdur-Rahman
states, failure is “thematized in the failure of [Thomas] Sutpen’s design and textualized in the
overwrought, interwoven, and largely speculative narrative that fails to make sense of it” (46).
However, the novel’s narrative and its failure are simultaneously constituted by a failure to
represent the Haitian Revolution. Sutpen could not have become the overseer of enslaved
Haitians on a sugar plantation in the 1820s, suppressed a revolution on said plantation, married
the planter’s daughter, become a planter himself, and so on—the causal events which comprise
his rise and fall could not have happened in a historical Haiti that had already abolished slavery
in the world’s only successful slave revolution (1791-1804).8 It would therefore seem that
Absalom, Absalom! maintains an indomitable “innocence” of history akin to that of its central
character. John T. Matthews summarizes this nicely: “Sutpen’s ‘innocent’ ‘mistakes’ about his
West Indian situation exemplify an extensive cultural apparatus dedicated to preserving
masterly innocence in new-world colonial Souths, and US imperial innocence in the
postcolonial world” (“Recalling” 239). Sutpen’s own “innocence,” especially insofar as it
implicates those who attempt to tell his story, epitomizes the episteme of Euro-American
imperialism.

Foregrounding the Haitian Revolution’s singular success does not imply that other groups of enslaved African
people did not resist their oppression in remarkable ways, nor diminish the accomplishments of those other
rebellions and revolutions.
8
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Even so, this “erasure” of the Haitian Revolution is not just another one of the several
narrative errors through which Absalom calls attention to its narrative reconstruction of the
Sutpen story as merely “true enough” (AA 268). Rather, the revolution’s absence constitutes the
Sutpen story, which itself is the absent center of the novel. The narrative inheres around the
latter void as Absalom’s various narrators attempt to piece together Sutpen’s history and
preoccupy themselves with its implications. Their narratives, however, remain “innocent” of the
absent revolution within the absent Sutpen. Accordingly, time fails in notable ways throughout
the novel that point to the constitutive absence of the Haitian Revolution: the time of
(plantation) capital becomes the linear, abstract force by which Sutpen forms his dynastic
“design” and attempts to begin it in Haiti; this temporality is disrupted in Haiti but then
ostensibly reasserted; this reassertion qua repression ensures that a repetition compulsion
emerges out of Sutpen’s non-experience of the Haitian Revolution; and, finally, this repetition
foregrounds the inability of the South to escape its illusions about its own history. In Absalom,
Absalom!, temporality as such remains inextricable from the narrative effacement of the Haitian
Revolution.
Keeping Time
An oft-overlooked precedent for the narrative’s distortion of historical time occurs via Shreve’s
interruption of Quentin and, by extension, Sutpen’s narrative. The former strains to correct the
latter’s attempt to name Sutpen’s actual origins: his birthplace. Quentin has begun “Because he
10

was born in West Virginia, in the mountains where—” when Shreve leaps into the narrative to
dispute this:
‘Not in West Virginia . . . Because if he was twenty-five years old in Mississippi in 1833,
he was born in 1808. And there wasn’t any West Virginia in 1808 because—’ ‘All right,’
Quentin said. ‘—West Virginia wasn’t admitted—’ ‘All right all right,’ Quentin said. ‘—
into the United States until—’ ‘All right all right all right,’ Quentin said. (AA 179)
Wanda Raiford points out that this passage “aligns the readers’ sympathies simultaneously with
the teller who would tell and against all interruptions . . . that delay revelations and distract from
the story” and that “it is through this very mechanism that . . . Sutpen’s account of himself . .
. avoids even casual examination” (110). The form of this interruption may indeed condition
the reader’s reception of Shreve’s attempt at historical accuracy as just some annoying pedantry
obstructing Quentin’s (and Sutpen’s) story. However, it also calls attention to the
constructedness of the story insofar as it remains unsettled and in motion through time and space,
as well as their ineluctable narrative synthesis: history. With his intervention, Shreve forces
Quentin to acknowledge that placing Sutpen in the space designated as West Virginia disrupts
the coherence of time as well. The western part of Virginia may well have been called “West
Virginia” in the antebellum period, but because West Virginia’s statehood is coeval with the
Civil War itself, this mistaken naming disrupts a reconstruction of the past (1808) by imposing
a more recent past (1863) retroactively upon it. This interruption, then, foregrounds how
temporality shares contingency with spatiality in the text. Indeed, this contingency is the
11

precondition of historical production. It presents an irresolvable contradiction with which
Quentin can only defer confrontation. He thus interrupts his interruptor to repeat (and
accumulate) the oblique acknowledgement “All right” as a means of staving off the Real of
historiography.
Conversely, Sutpen fixates on linearity as the primary means by which to fortify his
“innocence” of historical contingency. Quentin suggests that Sutpen discovers his “design”—
the grand scheme by which he can become a rich planter— “all of a sudden” (AA 178).
Moreover, it appears ex nihilo: “He did not even know that it existed to be wanted, to need to
be done, until he was almost fourteen years old” (179). While his childhood experience at the
Tidewater plantation house door later proves to be the impetus, the emphasis here is on the very
contingency of Sutpen’s formation of this plan. In this telling, he does not expect it; it simply
occurs to him. Still, it is the compression of life-time in this epiphanic moment that compels
him toward linear self-progress: “he discovered, not what he wanted to do but what just had to
do, had to do it whether he wanted to or not, because if did not do it he knew that he could
never live with himself for the rest of his life” (178). From the terms set by “the rest of his life,”
Sutpen derives an idea of linearity toward death; he thus becomes preoccupied with “all the men
and women that had died to make him had left inside of him for him to pass on, with all the
dead ones waiting and watching to see if he was going to do it right” (178). The accretion of
ancestral obligation engenders Sutpen’s “obsession with his own bloodline [which] invokes an
obsession with linear progressivism, with a uniquely Southern ‘design’” (Aboul-Ela 144). The
12

temporality of this design not only determines Sutpen’s trajectory toward imperialistic
“progress” in Haiti, but also is itself determined by his interpellation into capitalist ideology.
The contradictions of historiography inhere throughout the narratives of Absalom,
Absalom!, but for Sutpen they become increasingly pronounced during his literal passage into
the planter capitalist society of Tidewater, Virginia. Sutpen has spent his youth in Appalachia
living in a poor, but seemingly pre-capitalist society, the relations of which he theorizes in
retrospect of his own ignorance:
he did not imagine . . . that there existed all the objects to be wanted which there were,
or that the ones who owned the objects not only could look down on the ones that
didn’t, but could be supported in the down-looking not only by the others who owned
the objects too but by the very ones that were looked down on that didn’t own any
objects and knew they never would. Because where he lived the land belonged to
anybody and everybody and so the man who would go to the trouble and work to fence
off a piece of it and say ‘This is mine’ was crazy. (AA 179)
Capitalist ideology is at first foreign to Sutpen—in his naive impressions of the relations of
plantation capitalism, he therefore perceives commodities, private property, and even “false
consciousness” from an external standpoint.9 The drastic change involved in moving to

The utility of the term “false consciousness” has been rightfully disputed due to its tendency to feature in vulgar
Marxist analyses. I use it here with Georg Lukács’s words in mind: “The ‘falseness,’ the illusion implicit in this
situation is in no sense arbitrary; it is simply the intellectual reflex of the objective economic structure” (HCC 52).
9
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Tidewater thus takes on the character of a sharp descent: he “had hardly heard of such a world
until he fell into it” (180). Sutpen’s shock comes from the social totalization of the plantation
form; in short, he is confronted by what Paul Gilroy calls “capitalism with its clothes off” (15).
Due to this disorientation, the temporality of this family journey eludes Sutpen: “He didn’t
remember if it was weeks or months of a year they traveled . . . whether it was that winter then
spring and then summer overtook and passed them on the road or whether they overtook and
passed in slow succession the seasons as they descended” (AA 181-2). Sutpen’s inability to
cognitively delimit the journey from Appalachia to Tidewater—from pre-capitalism to
plantation capitalism—in terms of natural time (seasons) or abstract time (weeks, months, etc.)
connotes the temporal upheaval involved in this transition. His confusion stems from his
inaugural encounter with the temporal abstraction imposed by the capitalist mode of
production, the abstraction required to extract surplus value from labor-time.
To be clear, the Southern form of plantation capitalism is not identical to the forms of
capitalism in the northern U. S. and elsewhere. It does, however, resemble a later stage of the
mercantilist colonial form—that of which Haiti had been (as the French colony of SaintDomingue) the Caribbean epitome.10 As historian Mark M. Smith argues, the dawning of
industrialism ushered in developments to which Southern and colonial planters were not

10

C. L. R. James: “If on no earthly spot was so much misery concentrated as on a slave-ship, then on no portion
of the globe did its surface in proportion to its dimensions yield so much wealth as the colony of San Domingo”
(46).

14

exempt: “planters’ adoption of clock time . . . satisfied simultaneously their drive for profit, their
desire for discipline and social order, and . . . their claim to modernity” (5). This new temporality
also exemplified the combined unevenness of capitalist development: while “in some respects,
planters’ use of clock time was more akin to . . . the conception of time embodied in eighteenth
century mercantilist orthodoxy” (5), “clock time and natural time were never mutually exclusive
in the South. Rather, they were complementary” (11). For Sutpen, clock time in Tidewater does
not function as the abrogation of natural time, but as the intrusion of abstraction which defies
his ability to symbolically register his passage into capitalist society. Therefore, when Quentin
notes that “you couldn’t call it a period because as [Sutpen] remembered it . . . it didn’t have
either a definite beginning or a definite ending. Maybe attenuation is better” (AA 182),
attenuation signifies the slippage, or the leakage, of time concurrent with transition into a form
of social existence which demands the partial dissolution of the concrete (time of actual events)
into the abstract (universalizing time of capital).
Another notable effect of Sutpen’s entrance into the space of plantation capitalism is
the conflation of time with space: the passage of the former appears couched in the terms of the
latter. On their way to Tidewater, the distortion of space indexes Sutpen’s inchoate awareness
of his family’s newly “furious inertness and patient immobility” in class society (AA 182).
Instead of framing the journey as human movement, he sees “the earth, the world, rising about
them and flowing past as if the cart moved on a treadmill” (182). This spatial metaphor for time
resonates with the spatialization of time under capital. Even more relevant to Sutpen’s later
15

experience in Haiti, it is this development that also instills the enslaved’s increased capacity for
resistance. Smith writes:
For slaves, clock time was important but . . . it was not internalized . . . Masters, however,
had much earlier become enslaved by a power they themselves had helped create for the
purposes of furthering their profits and their mastery. By 1860 they would have
sympathized with Georg Lukács’s assessment of the tyrannical nature of clock time in
the twentieth century: “Through the subordination of man to the machine the situation
arises in which men are effaced by their labor . . . Time is everything, man is nothing; he
is at the most the incarnation of time.” (qtd. in Smith 15)
Smith incorrectly cites Lukács here; the passage he finds in History and Class Consciousness (89)
is a quotation of Karl Marx’s The Poverty of Philosophy (127). Nevertheless, by involving Lukács,
this error actually enhances Smith’s claim regarding planters becoming “mastered” by the
temporality they instituted; immediately after citing Marx here, Lukács goes on to argue: “Thus
time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into an exactly delimited,
quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable ‘things’ . . . in short, it becomes space” (HCC
90, my italics). In this crucial underpinning to his reification argument, Lukács gestures towards
the exact relationship with time that, according to Smith, Sutpen would have developed through
his roles as plantation overseer and planter.
As the overseer of a Haitian sugar plantation, therefore, Sutpen first becomes a
timekeeper—the violence and brutality he visits upon the enslaved in order to extract surplus
16

value from their labor-time is also the enforcement of spatialized, abstract clock time. On the
plantation, Sutpen functions as the agent of the very temporality which at first bewildered him
in Tidewater. Recognizing that Sutpen manages the labor of the enslaved through the
imposition of a spatial logic of time also determines his “design.” Thus, not only does “Sutpen’s
end com[e] as a direct consequence of his obsessive White, male, linear patrilineality” (AboulEla 149), but the internalization of this temporality qua space is also a key aspect of his
incomprehension of the radical temporality of the Haitian Revolution.11
Black Radicality and Temporal Rupture
As Cedric Robinson contends, the Black radical tradition arises through the enslaved’s unique
relationship to the past: “it was the materials constructed from a shared philosophy developed
in the African past and transmitted as culture from which revolutionary consciousness was
realized and the ideology of struggle formed” (309). Black conceptions of liberation, then, may
be legible both as distinct from European abstract freedom and as concomitant with a
revolutionary time consciousness rooted in African history and tradition. Moreover, this shared
inheritance is honed through collective resistance to the material structures of slavery and

Situating plantation temporality specifically in Tidewater also allows for the spatial foreshadowing of
revolutionary time which Sutpen attempts to subdue in Haiti. In 1801, over a decade prior to Sutpen’s arrival in
Tidewater, the area had experienced a slave uprising known as Prosser’s Rebellion. As historian Walter Johnson has
shown, the leader of this revolt, Gabriel Prosser, took direct inspiration from the Haitian Revolution: “Gabriel in
Virginia . . . imagined [his] own histor[y] as continuation of the revolution begun in Haiti" (212). This temporal
current between the Haitian Revolution and slave revolution in Tidewater implicates the latter as a space where
Sutpen first experiences plantation capitalist temporality in the aftermath of a revolution following in the tradition
of Haiti. Before he has even set foot in Haiti, Sutpen is already walking through a landscape in which the radical
time consciousness of Black emancipation has been repressed.
11
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imperialism. Rather than reliant on an essential distinction between European linear time and
African circular time, the temporality of the revolutionary African enslaved emerges out of the
contradiction between the two.
The Haitian Revolution developed its own unique temporality through its
interrogation of the central contradiction of the European Enlightenment: the ideal of freedom
and the material reality of slavery. The enslaved in Haiti achieved human freedom and equality
by working through this contradiction, and their revolution thus “entered history with the
peculiar characteristic of being unthinkable even as it happened” (Trouillot SP 73). The Haitian
Revolution emerges as unthinkable due to the radicality with which it did what contradicted all
dominant narratives of history: the African enslaved defeated the European colonizers and
actualized the emancipatory content of Enlightenment thought.12 This unthinkability would
not only run parallel to the unfolding of events in Haiti between 1791 and 1804, but would also
retain historiographical purchase for the centuries to come: “in most places outside of Haiti,
more than a century after it happened, the revolution was still largely unthinkable history”
(Trouillot SP 95). The antebellum South is undoubtedly one of the places in which a successful
slave revolution remains unthinkable. Therefore, the Revolution retains its capacity to explode
the equation of history with progress—the dominant historical narrative used to justify

However, it is also important not to impose teleological narratives of the Haitian Revolution: "the shared
accounts of time and history for which enslaved conspirators risked their lives and by which subsequent historians
have measured their progress along the path from African to American were as much effects as they were causes of
the process of revolt" (Johnson 212).
12
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slavery—and thus, by extension, the linear “design” which Sutpen envisions for himself as an
aspiring planter capitalist and slaveholder.
The Haitian Revolution takes on the status of a historical-temporal rupture because of
its redemption of the oppressed past and its embodiment of universality. As Susan Buck-Morss
writes, “human universality emerges in the historical event at the point of rupture. It is in the
discontinuities of history that people whose culture has been strained to the breaking point give
expression to a humanity that goes beyond cultural limits” (133). Out of the particular radicality
of the Haitian Revolution, itself a nonlinear form of struggle caught up in the African past,
emerges a universality which was illegible to the most radical of Enlightenment thinkers. 13 Not
the abstract spirit, but the concrete reality of the Haitian Revolution is what secures universal
emancipation: “Toussaint L’Ouverture’s constitution of 1801, without a doubt, took universal
history to the farthest point of progress by extending the principle of Liberty to all residents
regardless of race” (Buck-Morss 94). The racism against which the Haitian Revolution acts is
the product of the inhuman system of slavery on which European imperalism depended.
Therefore, it is fitting when Aimé Césaire asserts that “to study Saint-Domingue is to study one
of the origins, the sources of Western civilization”(23). Cesaire indicates that the universality of
the Revolution begins civilization in the West insofar as it actually concretizes human equality
in ways that the US American and French revolutions do not. Thus, this rupture is a beginning

Also important: embodying the universal does in no way guarantee the ultimate success of a struggle. Nothing
about the Haitian Revolution was inevitable.
13
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that has already happened—it lays bare the aporias immanent to Western civilization’s selfconception at the time of the revolution. Michel-Rolph Trouillot puts it succinctly: “the
historical process is always messy, often enough contradictory. But what happened in Haiti also
contradicted most of what the West has told both itself and others about itself” (SP 107).
Sutpen’s Retroactive (Non)Experience
Due to the Revolution’s contradiction of the historical narrative to which he subscribes, Haiti
itself remains unthinkable for Sutpen even while he is actually there. The US would not officially
recognize Haitian independence until 1862 (only once the South had seceded and the Civil War
had begun), and thus it exists only as a hazy, indeterminate space for Sutpen in the 1820s, similar
to the function of “West Virginia” as his birthplace—notably, however, Shreve does not
interrupt to set this particular historical record straight. Absalom’s first indication of Sutpen’s
exact location in the Caribbean lies in the phrase “besieged Haitian room” (AA 199), which
implies a violent event already underway. Correspondingly, Sutpen initiates a narrative violence
by “telling more of it . . . without telling how he got to where he was nor even how what he was
now involved in came to occur” (198). The suddenness with which Sutpen launches into “it”—
his story—causes Grandfather Compson great confusion. For him, the narrative arrives in Haiti
at a temporal disjuncture between signifier and signified: “he said how Sutpen was talking about
it again, telling him again before he realised that this was some more of it” (198). Retroactive
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signification appears throughout the Haitian section of Absalom, Absalom!; indeed, it
exemplifies Sutpen’s (in)ability to experience what happens there.
Such lack of clarity does not prevent Grandfather Compson from theorizing the
temporal violence of how Sutpen relates the beginning of the plantation uprising in Haiti, when
the latter flees from the enslaved who “rushed at him with their machetes”: “the getting from
the fields into the barricaded house, seemed to have occurred with a sort of violent abrogation
which must have been almost as short as his telling about it—a very condensation of time which
was the gauge of its own violence” (AA 201). Compson here narrates a precise equivalence
between the violence of the space Sutpen traverses between the Haitian sugar cane fields and the
plantation house and the span of time which Sutpen allocates to tell him about it. Not only does
this recall capitalism’s transformation of time into space, but it also suggests Sutpen’s inability
to register the violence, or at least to tell about it. His fear emerges retroactively: “he was not
afraid until after it was all over . . . because that was all it was to him—a spectacle, something to
be watched because he might not have a chance to see such again . . . he did not even know that
at first he was not terrified” (201). Sutpen’s fear contradicts and betrays itself. At first, Sutpen
seems to have not been afraid until the end of the revolution—“after it was all over”—because
of his passive engagement with it as a “spectacle.” Yet it is already clear that Sutpen actively
engages in resistance to the uprising: “he was now involved in . . . crouching behind a window
in the dark and firing the muskets through it” (198). Further, if he does not “at first” apprehend
his lack of terror, then he must have been convinced of his fear at the time. This confusion, the
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retrospective unthinkability of Sutpen’s fear as synchronous with the slave revolution, denotes
his actual trauma and concomitant inability to symbolically register both the event and its
causality.
The cause of Sutpen’s trauma is most apparent in the significance the smell of burning
sugar cane has for him. When the enslaved commence their revolution, they set the sugar cane
fields on fire. This act strongly resembles the historical initiation of the Haitian Revolution: in
1791, after the famous Bois Caïman ceremony, the Haitian enslaved burned all the sugar cane
fields in the northern Le Cap region (Trouillot “Fire” 28). Accordingly, Sutpen conflates the
horror presented by the unthinkability of the revolution with the smell of the burnt cane:
he said how you could smell it, you could smell nothing else, the rank sweet rich smell
as if the hatred and the implacability, the thousand secret dark years which had created
the hatred and implacability, had intensified the smell of the sugar: and Grandfather said
how he remembered then that he had seen Sutpen each time decline sugar for his coffee
and so he (Grandfather) knew why now but he asked anyway to be sure and Sutpen told
him it was true; that he had not been afraid until after the fields and barns were all
burned and they had even forgot about the smell of the burning sugar, but that he had
never been able to bear sugar since. (AA 200-1)
The fact that Sutpen involuntarily rejects sugar betrays the primal fear that the experience has
for him, of course, but his repeated claim to have “not been afraid until after” also underscores
his inability to fully experience this event; that is, to symbolically register it. He only registers it
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as a sensory event—it defies codification in language. Again, Sutpen’s fear of the revolutionary
enslaved emerges retroactively: “he mentioned fear by the same inverse process of speaking of a
time . . . before he became afraid” (201). Again, the historical rupture of the Haitian Revolution
resists the linear narrative of progress to which Sutpen would like his attempt to enrich himself
in the “West Indies” to adhere; instead, Black radical temporality, through its reach into the
African past, which for Sutpen can only be understood as “the thousand secret dark years,”
unsettles his white imperialist “innocence.”
Suppression, Repression, and Repetition
The stark simplicity with which Sutpen’s suppression of the revolution in Haiti is expressed
stands out among Absalom’s famously intricate prose: “he put the musket down and went out
and subdued them. That was how he told it: he went out and subdued them” (AA 204). In
contrast to much of the narrative, this part of the story is clearly related as linear and causal.
Within the narrative form in which this crucial information is presented, the possibility of
Sutpen’s claim to white, patrilineal sovereignty resurfaces—the linear, causal form reveals
precisely to what the content relates. Sutpen first puts down his gun, then he leaves the
barricaded plantation house, and only then can he “subdue” the enslaved. The immense
understatement of what must have been an exceptionally violent event further implies its nonexperience, despite the fact that this erasure of the successful Black revolution reasserts the logic
of whiteness and plantation capitalism. Trouillot explicates the fundamental contradiction of
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this logic: “On the one hand, resistance and defiance did not exist, since to acknowledge them
was to acknowledge the humanity of the enslaved. On the other hand, since resistance occurred,
it was dealt with quite severely, within or around the plantations” (SP 83). The severity with
which Sutpen suppresses the revolution is left completely ambiguous: “Not how he did it. He
didn’t tell that either, that of no moment to the story either; he just put the musket down and
had someone unbar the door and then bar it behind him, and walked out into the darkness and
subdued them” (AA 204-5). The dual valence of “moment” here is worth considering further.
The way in which Sutpen reverses history and prevents the revolution from spreading to other
plantations is not “of moment,” it is not important to the story—and it is simply not of a
moment, it cannot be reconciled to the revolutionary temporality contained within the point of
historical rupture. The oppressed past lives on in Absalom, Absalom!, but it does so in forms
(like the “shadowy” presence of Charles Bon) that haunt and ultimately destroy Sutpen and his
family. Therefore, in order to tell the story of this haunting, Black radicality is repressed—but it
is nevertheless represented in the ways it manages to return repeatedly.
The description of the plantation after Sutpen has put down the revolution foregrounds
this repetition: “and then daylight came with no drums in it for the first time in eight days” (AA
205). This attention to the lack of drums indicates the absence of Black revolution; earlier,
Grandfather Compson claims that as a plantation overseer Sutpen was “hearing the air tremble
and throb at night with the drums and the chanting and not knowing that it was the heart of
the earth itself he heard” (202). In a perspicacious reading of Absalom, Absalom! alongside
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memoirs of the US Marines occupying Haiti in the 20th century, Michael Kreyling notes that
“like the scent of burning sugarcane that becomes for Sutpen . . . the olfactory metaphor for the
ultimately unsubduable chaos of Haiti—rhythms eventually bring [US Marine John H.] Craige
. . . to the point of exhaustion. Drums are omnipresent in Craige’s consciousness” (130). Just as
for this actual agent of U. S. imperialism in Haiti, drums are also omnipresent for Sutpen— the
aural equivalent of the “olfactory metaphor” for Black radical agency. However, Vodou drums
are also more than just symbols of Haiti and the grounding of its revolutionary tradition in the
African past; they are also aural manifestations of repetition. As such, they represent the
recurrence of the repressed Black radicality mediated by the narrative. Therefore, if Sutpen
unconsciously (in the Lacanian sense of knowledge that does not know itself) hears in the drums
the “heart of the earth,” the expression of universality which emerges through the particular
struggle of the Haitian Revolution, the silence of the drums after he has “subdued” the
revolutionaries still does not entail the permanent silence of the revolution.
Perhaps with this in mind, Quentin’s notion of temporality—“Maybe nothing ever
happens once and is finished. Maybe happen is never once but like ripples maybe on water after
the pebble sinks” (AA 210)—signifies anew. Quentin speculates here that Southern history, or,
more precisely, telling the story of the South, involves not only the possibility of events
repeating, but also their accretions and attenuations of meaning. Telling Sutpen’s story spreads
its significance such that the narrators themselves—Jason Compson, Quentin, and Shreve—
become “Sutpen’s children,” or the ripples to his pebble; therefore, “maybe [it has taken]
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Thomas Sutpen to make all of us” (210). However, while the notion that “happen is never once”
conveys the repetition of events, the preceding claim that “nothing ever happens once and is
finished” also implies the continuity of “nothings” or non-events: those events which remain
unthinkable and irreconcilable to the symbolic order. This difference is not negligible, and it
expands upon the usual Freudian readings of Absalom, Absalom! and Faulkner’s oeuvre more
generally.14 As Alenka Zupančič points out, for Freud “what we find at the origin of repetition
is a repression of a traumatic event” (107). However, Zupančič, following Ray Brassier, argues
for a key complication: “what the compulsion to repeat repeats is not some traumatic and hence
repressed experience, but something which could never register as an experience to begin with.
The trauma which is being repeated is outside the horizon of experience (and is, rather,
constitutive of it)” (107). Sutpen’s trauma ensues from the radicality of the revolution which he
cannot symbolically register: the Haitian Revolution is his (and the novel’s) aboriginial nonevent. The narrative therefore mediates this non-event as an absence, an actual historical erasure.
On the other hand, the repeated fights which Sutpen orchestrates between himself and
the enslaved men on his plantation bind the excess generated by this trauma. Through these
exhibitions, Sutpen attempts to spectacularly subjugate, and thereby access, the enjoyment of
the Black Haitian other: “on certain occasions, perhaps at the end of the evening, the spectacle,
as a grand finale or perhaps as a matter of sheer deadly forethought toward the retention of

14

John T. Irwin’s Doubling and Incest/Repetition and Revenge is the exemplar of such a reading.
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supremacy, domination, he would enter the ring with one of the negroes himself” (AA 21). This
“retention of supremacy” is sheer illusion—if one of the enslaved were to actually defeat Sutpen,
he would surely have them killed. Its purpose is purely symbolic. Richard Godden suggests that
Sutpen’s “fights with Haitian slaves embody his recognition that slavery rests on a continuous
repression of revolution” (692). Indeed, “the fights . . . mark the return and control of repressed
materials” (699). However, Sutpen cannot “control” this material in perpetuity; this
“continuous repression” of revolution ostensibly restores linear historical progress—the labor
of the enslaved is what Sutpen tries to erect his dynasty upon—but this historical linearity also
“cannot be sundered from the concept of its progression through a homogeneous, empty time”
(Benjamin 205).
A Historical Vacuum
The homogeneity of time in the space of the U. S. South strikes Shreve as he listens to Quentin.
Towards the end of their attempted reconstruction of Sutpen’s story, a frustrated Shreve
declares his continued incomprehension of the South and its temporality:
We dont live among defeated grandfathers and freed slaves (or have I got it
backward and was it your folks that are free and the n—s that lost?) and bullets
in the dining room table and such, to be always reminding us to never forget.
What is it? something you live and breathe in like air? a kind of vacuum filled
with wraithlike and indomitable anger and pride and glory at and in happenings
that occurred and ceased fifty years ago? a kind of entailed birthright father and
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son and father and son of never forgiving General Sherman, so that forever more
as long as your children’s children produce children you wont be anything but
a descendent of a long line of colonels killed in Pickett’s charge at Manassas?’
‘Gettysburg,’ Quentin said. ‘You cant understand it. You have to be born there.’
(AA 289)
Quentin once more staves off the Real of historiography—like the “All right” with which he
responds to the West Virginia correction, the dismissal of Shreve’s understanding guards the
contradictions of Southern history by maintaining their obscurity for the uninitiated outsider.
Granting congruence to select history—placing the right Confederate general at the right
battle—covers over the bare incongruence between the brutality of slavery and the romantic
“lost cause” fantasy of white gentility.15 It is the latter “history” that Shreve finds the South
intent on never forgetting. Remembering history in this way ensures that the South’s history is
not that of the Black oppressed; rather, it preserves itself through the tragic narcissism of the
defeated whites. Shreve’s parenthetical, his ironic reversal of white Southerners as free in contrast
to defeated Black people, hints at this distinction: the material reality of the South inheres in the
continued dispossession, disenfranchisement, and violent oppression of Black people that
continues after the Civil War. However, the fixation on “defeated grandfathers” effaces that past
and present oppression such that the latter becomes indistinguishable from the former. The

It is often pointed out that the paradigmatic text of new plantation fiction, Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the
Wind, was published in the same year (1936) as Absalom, Absalom!
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white South tells itself about those “happenings that occurred and ceased fifty years ago” in
order to maintain its reactionary past as the present because the contradictions of slavery are
constitutive of that ideological fantasy of “pride and glory” to which the South still clings. That
this temporal collapse between past and present evokes for Shreve a “kind of vacuum” further
attests to its homogeneity. Retelling the counterrevolutionary (hi)story of the South disavows
the reality of Black self-emancipation, that historical reality of both the Civil War and the
Haitian Revolution.
In Absalom, Absalom!, the Haitian enslaved whom Sutpen repeatedly “subdues”
ultimately emancipate themselves: “all of Sutpen’s negroes had deserted also to follow the
Yankee troops away” (AA 67), and “the negroes . . . had followed the first Yankee troops to pass
through Jefferson” (99). Despite their understatement and disregard for the autonomy of Black
people—the enslaved merely “follow” the Union army in this account—these passages recall the
famous claim of W. E. B. Du Bois: “Nothing else made emancipation possible in the United
States . . . but the record of the Negro soldier as a fighter” (BR 104). Further, the history of the
Civil War as Black revolution has been obscured by “one of the most stupendous efforts the
world ever saw to discredit human beings” (Du Bois BR 727), a silencing similar to that of Haiti:
“the revolution that was thought impossible by its contemporaries has also been silenced by
historians” (Trouillot SP 96).
The Haitian Revolution and Messianic Time
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Faulkner was always preoccupied with the intransigent temporal experience of history in the
South; indeed, the lines from which Faulkner scholars can seemingly never escape best
encapsulate this stasis: “The past is never dead. It’s not even past” (IV 535). This famous quote
contrasts most productively with Walter Benjamin’s conception of Messianic time in “Theses
on the Philosophy of History.” Unlike the South’s inability to redeem the past, Benjamin’s
“now-time” of revolution both reaches into the past and emerges from it to “blast open the
continuum of history” (207). These words on the nonlinear character of revolution resonate
with C. L. R. James’s description of Haiti: “the ceaseless slow accumulation of centuries bursts
into volcanic eruption” (x). In Absalom, however, the temporal rupture of the historical Haitian
Revolution has been sublated into the work as an absence constitutive of the narrative of
Thomas Sutpen—his imperial “innocence” prevents him from “knowing that what he rode
upon was a volcano” (AA 202). Nevertheless, this knowledge becomes manifest in the novel by
following Benjamin’s charge to “brush history against the grain” (200). Paul Gilroy gestures
towards this Benjaminian task when claiming that “the time has come for the primal history of
modernity to be reconstructed from the slaves’ points of view” (55). Reading Absalom from the
point of view of the enslaved, brushing Sutpen’s history against the grain, not only unveils the
latent content of the novel, but also reveals how the narrative form itself mediates the
contingency and radical instability of history in the text. In other words, history remains
radically open and subject to rupture. As James says, “history does move. The thing is to see it”
(qtd. in Grimshaw 147).
30

Indeed, Faulkner’s narrative suggests that Supten overlooks the very “planting” of the
Haitian Revolution: “the planting of men too: the yet intact bones and brains in which the old
unsleeping blood that had vanished into the earth they trod still cried out for vengeance” (AA
202). In this vivid image of the afterlife of slavery’s injustices, the incipient universal radicality
of the Haitian enslaved has and will become the rupture, the revolutionary consciousness that
breaks open the homogenous clock time of capitalism—the time which appears in forms of
abstraction and linearity in Absalom. Moreover, Absalom’s planting metaphor evokes Toussaint
L'Ouverture's parting words to the French counterrevolutionaries: “In overthrowing me, you
have cut down in San Domingo only the trunk of the tree of liberty. It will spring up again by
the roots for they are numerous and deep” (James 334). Reading Absalom, Absalom!’s
representation of the U.S. South against the non-representation of self-emancipated Haiti
proves that the former, unlike the latter, has not yet realized that its “past carries with it a
temporal index by which it is referred to redemption” (Benjamin 197). The South thus
experiences time and history as what might be termed a “persistence of happening”— the
Faulknerian ethos of both “happen is never once” and “The past is never dead.” This atavistic
continuum sits opposite Benjamin’s “Messianic cessation of happening, or, put differently, a
revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past” (207)—the temporal rupture of the
Haitian Revolution.
The various narrators of Absalom, Absalom! try and fail to piece together the story of
Thomas Sutpen because a revolutionary rupture continues to be unthinkable—the narrative
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fails to signify Black emancipation. Sutpen’s myth relies on the abstract time of plantation
capitalism, the suppression of Black revolutionary time, and the homogenous “vacuum” of
Southern time—but the narrative scaffolding of these elements ultimately fails, problematizing
linear progress. The novel’s vast and tangled narrative reflects this particular failure. “Deferred
revelation,” Edouard Glissant writes, “is the source of [Faulkner’s] technique” (9). Absalom’s
technique, insofar as time and history are concerned, emerges from deferred revolution.
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2

‘the little lost island’: Space and Imperialism

The failure to represent the Haitian Revolution in Absalom, Absalom! also generates an
ideological distortion of historical space which is consequent with the repression of this
revolution’s temporal rupture. The novel renders the space of Haiti in ways which evoke the
actual historical legacies of colonialism and imperialism contemporary to its French
colonization and anachronistic to the 1820s, thereby intermingling the historical and ideological
spaces in which Thomas Sutpen’s rise as a plantation capitalist takes place.16 The depiction of
Haitian space in Faulkner’s novel is also symptomatic of the same objective conditions under
capitalist modernity which determined the representations of colonial and imperialized spaces
in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and Eugene O’Neill’s The Emperor Jones: the European
and US imperial interventions abroad contemporary to the production of these works. These
same conditions also betray the impossibility of conceiving social totality under such a modern
world-system. Nevertheless, the Haitian Revolution, as an event embodying the enslaved’s grasp
of historical totality, continues to inform Faulkner’s text through its absence.

In this essay, I understand imperialism with Edward Said as “the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a
dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory” (9), but ground this understanding in the material basis
for the practice itself: capitalist accumulation. I thus try to avoid the “main problem” which the Warwick Research
Collective identify in Said’s work: he “presents imperialism as a political dispensation rather than as a process of
accumulation on a world scale” (31). I also find the terms “core” and “periphery” more useful than “metropolitan
center” and “distant territory” because of their ability to simultaneously include and supersede nation-state
relations, and because of their spatial analogy to the combined unevenness of capitalist development.
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Hosam Aboul-Ela has found the significance of space vis-à-vis time in Absalom “another
means of subverting the unity of a monolithic temporal line of history, and the geohistorical
inequalities that determine the true nature of relationships between spaces play a heightened
role” (136). However, he also claims that the narrative bears a spatial relation to history itself:
“political history and political economy infiltrate the narrative through glancing but repeated
references that often play determinative roles at the margins” (136). I would suggest instead that
history does not in fact “infiltrate” the narrative. History is not something external to the
narrative, but is rather already present in, mediated by, and constitutive of the textual object. It
is by immanently working through the object that history becomes objectivized. Aboul-Ela is
conscious of Haiti’s contradictory presence via the Haitian Revolution’s absence, but he
characterizes the narrative’s mediation of this particular space as between the novel and history,
rather than within the textual object: “Not only is the description of what happens in Haiti brief
and vague, but the novel continually refers to its incompleteness . . . The space of the West Indies
hovers above the reconstructed narrative, supplying a cohesion that temporality cannot” (148).
Rather than something “hovering above,” Absalom’s depiction of Haitian space is an ineluctable
aspect of the incomplete center of the Sutpen narrative, which is of course the absent center of
the novel itself.
Plantation Space and Haiti
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Sutpen begins telling Grandfather Compson “more of it, already into what he was telling yet
still without telling how he got to where he was nor even how what he was now involved in . .
. came to occur” (AA 198). The ellipsis here elides a parenthetical statement which compensates
for the stated lack of information provided by Sutpen, which it accomplishes by relating
scattered details about the situation in which Sutpen is “involved.” These details provide the
very first glimpse of Sutpen in Haitian space, though it is not yet identified as such: “(obviously
at least twenty years old now, crouching behind a window in the dark and firing the muskets
through it which someone else loaded and handed to him)” (198). This image serves first to
evoke an indeterminate (though presumably “West Indian”) space in which Sutpen has matured
into an adult of twenty, and in which he is now engaged in a conflict against an unseen,
unseeable enemy alongside “someone else” who provides him with weapons. This space is
marked only by the liminal space of the window—all else is dark. This initial tension between
whether Sutpen is inside or outside the building in which the window must exist recalls Sutpen’s
traumatic episode when as an indigent child he is told by a Black butler to remain outside the
Tidewater plantation house—Sutpen himself consciously calls attention to how his “design” to
become a rich planter begins as a result of this symbolic relegation to the exterior: “now he would
take that boy where he would never again need to stand on the outside of a white door and knock
at it: and not at all for mere shelter but so that that boy . . . could shut that door himself forever
behind him on all he had ever known” (210). However, here the tension between inside and
outside is finally resolved when that space first becomes Haitian. Through the act of narration,
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Sutpen is “getting himself and Grandfather both into that besieged Haitian room” (198-99).
The preposition into and the participle besieged signify together that Sutpen and Compson are
within the structure rather than outside of it—they have traveled again to this space via the
narrative. The structural significance of the room becomes clearer when the sentence later
clarifies that as “overseer or foreman or something to a French sugar planter, [Sutpen] was
barricade in the house with the planter’s family” (199). The window, room, and house are thus
structural components of what is finally revealed to be a plantation. The narrative unfolds
retroactively into the plantation; that is, the sentence’s form “backs” Sutpen into a space that
emerges first as the site of a window which separates two battling factions, then as a Haitian
edifice implied by its room, and lastly as the plantation house in which a French family (if not
Sutpen) presumably lives and now fights. Sutpen’s situation in Haiti, as the initiation of his
“design,” functions as the first narrative negation of his childhood rejection by the plantation,
the attempted reversal of this loss. Through his defense of the planter’s family, prior to and
concomitant with his suppression of the revolution, Sutpen first begins to operate from within
the structure of the plantation.
Sutpen’s position inside the plantation house and his active defense of it thus allies him
with property, which in turn confirms his whiteness. While as a poor white in Virginia he could
not enter the front door of the Tidewater plantation house, as an overseer in Haiti he not only
has access to the house, he fights on behalf of its symbolic authority. Because of his alliance with
property, the entirety of the space which he traverses in his work as the French plantation
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overseer still eludes his comprehension. Sutpen does not perceive the imminence of the
revolution on the plantation—he remains "innocent" of the enslaved's capacity for resistance
and desire for emancipation. His initial understanding of the profit to be had in Caribbean space
continues to inform and limit the extent to which Haiti functions as anything more than a site
abroad from which value can be extracted.
The Ideological Mapping of Haiti
Sutpen claims to never have even learned the geographic location of the “West Indies” prior to
going there; rather, what stirs his ambitions is learning “that there was a place called the West
Indies to which poor men went in ships and became rich, it didn’t matter how, so long as that
man was clever and courageous” (AA 195).17 Within the ideological heft of individual
bootstrapping determination, this vision of imperialist extractionism clearly denotes that the
ethics involved in accumulation do not objectively “matter”—the imperial subject need only be
“clever and courageous” irrespective of the social consequences of their actions. Moreover, the
“poor men in ships” involved are implicitly racialized; once again, whiteness and purported
access to property are ideologically aligned and defined against the determination of Blackness
by the appropriation of the Black body as property via enslavement. Eric Williams describes this

17 As Aboul-Ela has also pointed out (153), Sutpen’s knowledge accords perfectly with C. L. R. James’s description

of the opportunistic “small whites” that flocked to Saint-Domingue: “From the underworld of two continents they
came, Frenchman and Spaniards, Maltese, Italians, Portuguese and Americans. For whatever a man’s origin, record
or character, here his white skin made him a person of quality and rejected or failures in their own country flocked
to San Domingo, where consideration was achieved at so cheap a price, money flowed and opportunities of
debauchery abounded” (33). It is almost as if James were theorizing an “international Sutpen” here.

37

relation succinctly: “Slavery was not born of racism; rather, racism was the consequence of
slavery” (4). Within the actual plantation economy, the “poor men in ships” very rarely became
rich themselves—the men who owned the ships, the maritime bourgeoisie, merely enriched
themselves further through the profits generated by the plantations on which they themselves
rarely resided. The “poor men in ships” instead reaped the ideological wages of whiteness. All of
these unconscious aspects of Sutpen’s knowledge of the West Indies are immersed in racial
ideology and ultimately determined by the logic of capitalist accumulation. Sutpen’s
formulation might then be revised as: “there was a place called the West Indies to which poor
white men went in ships and in attempting to become rich by whatever means possible, they
participated in, enforced, and profited from ruthlessly exploited the labor of the Black enslaved.”
When the topic of Sutpen’s limited knowledge of the West Indies is raised again later,
Quentin interjects a parenthetical into the narrative: Grandfather Compson’s own
interpretation of the idea of Haiti as “the place where money was to be had quick if you were
courageous and shrewd” (AA 201). Compson first calls the signifier “shrewd” into question:
“[Sutpen] did not mean shrewdness, Grandfather said. What he meant was unscrupulousness
only he didn’t know that word because it would not have been in the book from which the
school teacher read. Or maybe that was what he meant by courage, Grandfather said” (201).
What in the earlier formulation had appeared as “clever and courageous” now becomes
“courageous and shrewd” before Compson finally clarifies that both signifiers do not have the
signifieds that Sutpen actually intends (or what Compson believes he should mean). Rather,
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unscrupulousness might have substituted for either, thus signaling that the actual “skill” involved
in capitalist accumulation within Haitian space is the unrestrained embrace of the violent
exploitation of enslaved labor. However, Sutpen’s ignorance seemingly prevents him from
knowing that he means unscrupulousness, just as he remains oblivious to the signs of revolution
on the plantation and also to the fear this revolt engenders in him.18 Yet this ignorance, this
“innocence,” which is ascribed to Sutpen almost as often as he seems to mention his famous
“design,” is both the byproduct of and catalyst for the design insofar as it resembles an
imperialist paradigm. As Matthews writes, Sutpen “overlooks what he oversees” (“Recalling”
253). Sutpen can remain strategically innocent of the consequences of the brutal system in
which he participates by “not knowing that he was overseeing it” (AA 203).19 Therefore, in the
narrative, “he did not even know that he had found the place where money was to be had quick”
because he also must repress the knowledge he would have gained first-hand that “high mortality
was concomitant with the money and the sheen on the dollars was not from gold but from
blood” (AA 201-2). Compson’s words here unveil the relations of not only the French regime
of plantation capitalism in Saint-Domingue but also of the entire colonialist and imperialist
history in which the US is also complicit.

The retroactivity by which Sutpen experiences (and does not perceive) this fear stems from the trauma the
Haitian Revolution produces as an unthinkable non-event which cannot be symbolically registered. See Chapter
1, pp. 19-21.
19 Wanda Raiford terms this specific form of Sutpen’s ignorance his “imperial innocence” (103).
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This violence is explicitly mapped onto Haitian space through formal association: “not
from gold but from blood—a spot of earth which might have been created and set aside by
Heaven itself” (AA 202). In the lines that follow, Quentin relates Grandfather Compson’s
description of Haiti as a “theatre” which, while “a little island set in a smiling and fury-lurked
and incredible indigo sea,” contains an immense quotient of “violence and injustice and
bloodshed and all the satanic lusts of human greed and cruelty” (202). Whether a “spot of earth,”
“theatre,” or “island,” Haiti is also a fallen space, a once-Edenic location symbolically and
materially corrupted by the greed unleashed by the unrestrained exploitation and degradation
of the enslaved in the interest of extraction and accumulation. Just as when Sutpen “had hardly
heard of such a world until he fell into it” (180)—the spatial metaphor for his passage from precapitalist Appalachia into plantation capitalist Tidewater—Haiti has been “set aside by Heaven”
and designated as a kind of hell on earth into which Sutpen now chooses to fall. By perpetuating
this hell through “subduing” the slave revolution, he manages to emerge from this space with a
wife and “property” (the enslaved he brings with him to Mississippi).20 Fittingly, then, for a man
whose ‘rise’ begins in a kind of “hell,” one of the prominent sobriquets for Sutpen throughout
Absalom, Absalom! is “demon.” The very first direct identification of Sutpen in the novel is
“man-horse-demon” and the accompanying “sulphur-reek” (4). “Demon” replaces the signifier
“Sutpen” in numerous instances throughout Absalom, particularly when Rosa Coldfield

20

See Chapter 1, p. 13 for a discussion of Sutpen’s “fall” between Appalachia and Tidewater.
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narrates—although Shreve adopts it too, interrupting Quentin at times to identify “the demon”
as the particular actant in question (181). Given the frequency with which Sutpen’s actions are
thereby deemed demonic, it seems reasonable to conclude that it is his participation in the space
defined by “satanic lusts of human greed and cruelty,” abstractions of the concrete abuses of the
enslaved through which plantation capitalism in Haiti turns obscene profits, which first
transform him into a “demon.”
Grandfather Compson relates the history of this obscenity through metaphor and
abstraction which both rely uniformly on space. He first places the “little island” on an explicitly
ideological map as “the halfway point between what we call the jungle and what we call
civilization” (AA 202). The phrasal qualifier “what we call” seems to fetishistically disavow “the
jungle” and “civilization” as ideologically contingent concepts. In acknowledging these two
concepts this way, Compson proves to be aware of the key contradiction of which Sutpen is
“innocent”: the violence in Haiti is the product of “civilization,” not the barbarism which the
West maps onto places like indigenous spaces such as “the jungle.” Yet he characterizes Africa in
ways which appeal to this ideology even as they tease the lie on which it is founded: “the dark
inscrutable continent from which the black blood, the black bones and flesh and thinking and
remembering and hopes and desires, was ravished by violence” (202). The darkness and
inscrutability of Africa as a continent (and the essentialism of it as simply a continent, which
erases an incredible diversity of social forms) embodies the way that European empires viewed
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it in order to justify the violence they rendered upon it.21 Before mentioning this rapacity,
however, Compson first identifies as Black the corporeality of African peoples (blood . . . bones
and flesh) and subjectivity (thinking and remembering and hopes and desires). Therefore, when
“ravished by violence” arrives, it is clear that this violence is a crime against Black human
subjects, not barbaric and inferior “beasts.” The space in the sentence between the subject,
Africa, and the phrase denoting the external violence which “ravishes” it allows for the latter to
signify as the crime against Black people who are still more than their corporeality, more than
the biological—even though racist ideology reduces them to this.22 Still, according humanity to
the African enslaved does not prevent Compson from rendering them as the ontologically
racialized Other: Black and unknowable.
Haiti thus functions in Absalom similarly to Conrad’s Africa in Heart of Darkness—as
a space of the racial Other: an “ideologically-saturated [space] which to some intents and
purposes [is] the imperialized place” (Said 67). In addition, Absalom does examine the material
conditions involved in the aforementioned violence. As an elaboration of the earlier image of
the bloody “sheen on the dollars,” the narrative reiterates the space of Haiti as a “little lost island”
with “soil manured with black blood from two hundred years of oppression and exploitation
until it sprang with an incredible paradox of peaceful greenery and crimson flowers and sugar

This characterization may also be read as an allusion to Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness.
Frantz Fanon explicates this racist figuration clearly: “The black man represents the biological danger . . . for the
black man is nothing but biological” (143).
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cane sapling size and three times the height of a man” (AA 202). The natural beauty of Haiti
here, in a neat reversal of the actual environmental devastation monocropping initiated, starkly
contradicts the ugliness of the abuses which occurs there. The regal stature of the cane is
inescapably the result of the obscene plantation system which exists to cultivate it: the cane is
“valuable pound for pound almost with silver ore, as if nature held a balance and kept a book
and offered a recompense for the torn limbs and outraged hearts even if man did not” (202).
Here the impersonal force of nature seems to provide the only semblance of justice in Haiti, a
perspective which makes freshly obscene the slaveholders’ profit on sugar yields: they benefit
directly from nature’s compensation for the violence enacted against the enslaved workers. The
unmentioned direct agents of this violence, the planters and overseers, therefore clearly depend
on the sugarcane’s exchange-value (indicated in the comparison of its value to silver ore) as
opposed to its use-value (though the impressive proportions of the cane imply its material
abundance). Indeed, the spatial arrangement of imperialism here assigns pure exchange-value to
the sugar commodity in the colonial space in order to then situate most of its use-value among
the colonizing powers in Europe, where the sugar is consumed. This makes Absalom’s Haiti an
emphatically capitalist economic space, albeit one in which surplus value is ultimately extracted
brutally from the labor-time of enslaved Africans, who are metonymized here as “torn limbs”
and “outraged hearts.” This brief description thus maps precisely the relations of plantation
capitalism.
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Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is this very web of relations that has
also produced, or “planted,” the resistance of the enslaved: “the yet intact bones and brains in
which the old unsleeping blood that had vanished into the earth they trod still cried out for
vengeance” (AA 202). If, as Hughes Azérad claims, “close examination of the Haitian passages
reveals a striking lucidity regarding the island’s ‘two hundred years of oppression and
exploitation’” (172), this is because Faulkner manages to show through Compson’s narrative of
history and ideology how the material practices of plantation capitalism in Haiti created the
conditions in which the Haitian Revolution was perfectly logical for the enslaved, even as it
remained unthinkable (or unseeable) for the imperialist powers. The obscenity of colonial
profits and abuses are on full display, but Sutpen, by virtue of his position as plantation overseer,
overlooks the violences in which he is fully complicit—he instead is “riding peacefully about . .
. not knowing that what he rode upon was a volcano” (AA 202).23 Concluding the summary of
what Sutpen does not see in Haiti with the assertion that the blood of the dead cries for
retribution against the oppressors from within the earth explicitly locates a revolutionary
practice within a geographical and discursive space that is inaccessible to the white planter
capitalists and their allies. However, in implying that the revolution has yet to occur, it absents the
historical Haitian Revolution from that very space.
Imperialized Space(s)
The metaphor which ties volcanic eruption to revolutionary rupture has already been examined in Chapter 1,
p. 28, but I return to it here to now understand Haitian space as the volcano itself, the set of spatial inequalities
coeval with imperialist relations out of which the possibility of the temporal disturbance of revolution emerges.
23
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Haiti’s spatial affordances within the narrative also relate to imperialist conceptions of social
space, particularly when read alongside Heart of Darkness. Comparisons between this novel and
Absalom, Absalom! do not constitute a new phenomenon, and Conrad himself is “among those
few authors whose influence [Faulkner] would acknowledge” (Ross 199).24 Benita Parry’s
reading of Heart of Darkness elucidates how the novel’s registration of imperialist ideology
simultaneously condemns its reality while accepting its premises, thus requiring a dialectical
reading: “to proffer an interpretation of Heart of Darkness as a militant denunciation and a
reluctant affirmation of imperialist civilisation, as a fiction that exposes and colludes in
imperialism's mystifications, is to recognise its immanent contradictions” (39). Moreover, the
narrative form of Conrad’s novel, through its framing and layering, calls into question the act
of narration itself in ways much like Absalom, Absalom!. Therefore, in reading the two novels
together through the immanent contradictions present in each novel, imperialism’s relation to
social space and narrative space emerges through the ways in which Faulkner and Conrad
respectively mediate it. For example: “For Marlow, Africa is the negation of his own humanlydominated and dynamic social order, a domain where archaic energies are rampant” (Parry 32),
a similar process to the one by which Compson situates Haiti as “the halfway point between

Ross’s article cites Richard P. Adams and Albert Guerard, among others. Joseph L. Blotner’s seminal biography
of Faulkner and Cleanth Brooks’s critical oeuvre have also engaged this subject at length.
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what we call the jungle and what we call civilization” (AA 202). Parry’s interpretative findings
seem to apply to both Absalom, Absalom! and Heart of Darkness more generally:
Because the fiction does not dramatise a political struggle between coloniser and
colonised—indeed the human material for such a treatment is absent as the blacks are
not functional protagonists but figures in a landscape who do not constitute a human
presence—the confrontation between Europe and Africa is realised wholly as the
conflict between two polarised and incompatible epistemologies, an encounter which
displays the insufficiencies of positivism without endorsing metaphysics as an
alternative” (33).
The similarity between the characters of both novels is what most critics usually seize upon,
perhaps at the expense of the shared spatial dynamics.25 There is no “outside” to imperialist
ideology in either narrative through either set of narrators: “if we must . . . depend upon the
assertive authority of the sort of power that Kurtz wields as a white man in the jungle or that
Marlow, another white man, wields as narrator, there is no use looking for other, non-imperialist
alternatives; the system has simply eliminated them and made them unthinkable” (Said 24).
However, extradiegetic attention to the positions of the authors themselves remains important.
What Said claims about Conrad is equally true of Faulkner: “because Conrad also had an

25 Echoing Cleanth Brooks, Michael Gorra makes the comparison between Sutpen and the former: “in his mixture

of grandiloquence and greed Sutpen has more than a bit in common with the ruthless ivory-hunting Mr. Kurtz”
(182). For Brooks’s own characterization of this comparison, see William Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha Country,
Yale UP, 1963, p. 308.
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extraordinarily persistent residual sense of his own exilic marginality, he quite carefully . . .
qualified Marlow’s narrative with the provisionality that came from standing at the very
juncture of this world with another, unspecified but different” (24). In other words, the author’s
peripheral position may allow them to register the extremity of the unevenness of capitalist
modernization—for Faulkner on a national scale, while for Conrad on a world scale—even as
they mediate this incongruity (and also racialize it) by setting their novels in peripheralized
colonial spaces.26
Especially given the relative contemporaneity of the US military occupation of Haiti
(1915-1934), which officially concluded two years before the publication of Absalom,
Absalom!, Faulkner may also have seen in Haiti another space incorporated as peripheral by the
US.27 Indeed, Haiti’s history is one of incessant peripheralization by core imperial powers—
perhaps most famously by the enormous indemnity France extorted in 1825 as compensation
for slaveholders’ loss of property in the revolution. Later in the nineteenth century, however,
US banks began to take on Haitian debt in order to secure claims to natural resources, such as
timber. It was thus a financial interest in Haiti’s political stability that gave the US government

Conrad’s uneasy identification as “English” and Faulkner’s ambivalence towards his status as an “American”
author respectively result from the spatial inequalities between Poland and Europe, and the US South within the
US.
27 Aboul-Ela makes convincing arguments in Other South for understanding Faulkner’s impressions of the US
South as a colonial space; utilizing the studies of historian C. Vann Woodward, Aboul-Ela points to “an ongoing
transition from agriculture to industry as the foundation of the economy, widespread monopolization of Southern
industry by Northern corporate magnates, and the emergence of a class of Southerners willing to do the bidding of
the Northern corporate elite” (4).
26
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an excuse to invade and occupy in order to further extract resources. The ideological
justification for invasion revolved around the idea that a paternalist and “civilizing” invention
was necessary to save the Haitians from their own political incompetence and social
backwardness, both of which were thoroughly racialized. Depictions of Haiti as a cultural
backwater, an African nation displaced in the Caribbean, continued to develop alongside the
actual military occupation by US marines, many of whom came from the US South.28 In
response, the Haitians drew on their revolutionary tradition to resist the Marines, especially the
forced labor corvée system which the US attempted to impose. The Caco Rebellion, led by
Charlemagne Péralte, fought against all such forms that resembled the relations of slavery and
pushed the US troops to the brink before eventual defeat in 1919. It therefore seems possible
for Faulkner to have sensed that Haiti, as a peripheral space where the Black oppressed struggled
against their white, and often Southern, oppressors, might be particularly relevant to a novel
about the contradictions and impossibilities of Southern history.
Mary Renda’s seminal study of the US occupation of Haiti contends that during this
time “U.S. Americans who presided over, visited, or read about Haiti found opportunities to
reimagine their own nation and their own lives as they appeared to be reflected by and refracted
through Haitian history and culture” (20). The occupation, by integrating Haiti as a US
imperial subject but maintaining its racial and cultural otherness, allowed for depictions of

Such Marines were recruited specifically because they were presumed to know how “to control the black
population” (Dubois Haiti 226).
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Haitians in a foreign Haitian space that could lend white characters coherent identity through
(mis)representations of what Toni Morrison would call “the wholly available and serviceable
lives of Africanist others” (25). Indeed, literary and artistic representation of Haiti exoticized it
specifically to “incorporate the foreign into American culture, while at the same time inscribing
its marginality and otherness” (Renda 22).
The historical proximity of Faulkner’s creation of Absalom, Absalom! to the occupation
of Haiti leads Elizabeth Steeby to read Sutpen as a “U.S. marine, an ambassador of U.S. military
and culture, who looks to Haiti to provide resources and raw materials in the service of U.S.
empire-building” (152).29 In a complementary reading, Michael Kreyling, noting a resonance
between occupying US Marine John H. Craige’s memoir Black Baghdad and Absalom, finds
that “in the context of U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean in the 1930s, Sutpen’s racism seems as
contemporary to the first third of the twentieth century as it does to the antebellum South”
(131). Kreyling also makes a related claim that is worth quoting at length as an expression of the
general critical consensus on Faulkner and the Haitian occupation:
If it may be argued that much of Sutpen’s context as a fictional character is
contemporary to the occupation (rather than retrospective, dredged up from a southern
collective memory of plantation mastering), then the charge that Faulkner erred in

See Leigh Ann Duck, “From Colony to Empire: Postmodern Faulkner” in Global Faulkner, pp. 24-42, for an
adjacent suggestion: Sutpen’s experience resembles that of Faustin Wirkus, “the Marine who had reportedly been
crowned king,” in William Seabrook’s The Magic Island, perhaps the most influential literary sensationalist
account of Haiti contemporary to the US occupation.
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dating the Haitian revolution could be reduced. We could say that Faulkner did not
have to remember Haiti correctly or in the historical order; he was saturated in the full
paradigm of the Haiti of the symbolic. (130)
In this formulation, Kreyling correctly identifies the ideological basis of Faulkner’s Haiti, a
relation similar to that which Said maps between Conrad and the Africa of Heart of Darkness.
However, he underestimates the degree to which Faulkner’s error is still primarily about the
Haitian Revolution. If Faulkner’s depiction of Haiti simply relied on racist caricature and
“Voodoo,” and if it were a place through which Sutpen simply passes, Kreyling would be right
about the paradigm he proposes. But Sutpen does not just pass through Haiti; rather, his
suppression of the slave revolution in Haiti is specifically what constitutes his rise (and fall), and
thus his narrative. In order for Sutpen to suppress this diegetic revolution, Faulkner has to
repress the historical Haitian Revolution. In other words, the Haiti of Absalom, Absalom! is still
essentially a revolutionary space, a space where the Haitian Revolution is erased but remains as a
kind of palimpsest through the narrated resistance of the enslaved to the white imperialists.
Furthermore, during the occupation the armed resistance of the Cacos to the US Marines often
appeared in the news as such—and the Cacos often explicitly drew on the traditions of the
Haitian Revolution.30 The relation between this contemporary struggle and the Haitian

“The Cacos who confronted [US] forces sought to draw on Haitian military traditions that stretched back to
the slave insurrection of 1791. Like Haiti’s original rebels, they avoided open and direct engagements with the
superior firepower of their opponents, opting instead for guerilla warfare” (Dubois Haiti 229).
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Revolution is the means by which the occupation context impacts Faulkner. On one hand, as
Barbara Ladd glosses: “there is little doubt that Faulkner wrote Absalom out of a deep familiarity
with the political and cultural situation in New Orleans and in Haiti, especially as it was
perceived by and important to nineteenth- and early twentieth-century southerners” (142); yet,
on the other hand, Faulkner does not only replicate a received ideological idea of Haiti as a
backward and primitive space; rather, he mediates it through the layered narrative of the novel
as the product of an imperialist intervention in which both he and the US South are implicated,
and as a space of incipient, if not perpetual, revolution.
The Haitian Theatre
It is difficult to discern what Faulkner actually read or engaged with, and thus a challenge to
document his presumed familiarity with Haiti. Beyond identifying the influence of Conrad and
Heart of Darkness, critics have generally not connected the Haiti of Absalom, Absalom! to other
depictions of imperialized space with which it might be in dialogue. However, there is one
cultural representation of Haiti with which Faulkner must have been familiar: Eugene O’Neill’s
1920 play The Emperor Jones. Faulkner’s knowledge of this play is certain for the simple fact that
he wrote about it: the young, as yet unknown Faulkner mentions the play in a 1922 essay entitled
“American Drama: Eugene O’Neill.” To begin the piece, Faulkner notes two exceptions to the
provinciality of artistic production: Conrad and O’Neill. Claiming that both are “anomalies” in
this regard, he finds that Conrad “has overturned all literary tradition in this point” before
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averring that O’Neill “though young as he is . . . is already a quantity to make one wonder” (86).31
Faulkner’s admiration for the singularity of Conrad and O’Neill’s work attests to his familiarity
with their respective challenges to periodization—neither strictly adheres to conventions of
realism, naturalism, modernism—and also suggests that he might admire their appropriations
of colonial contexts as a means of avoiding narrow provincialism. He above all finds the form of
their writing powerful: “[what] made the ‘Emperor Jones’ rise up and swagger in his egoism and
cruelty, and die at last through his own hereditary fears . . . [is] clarity and simplicity of plot and
language” (88). This summary of Brutus Jones’ rise and fall could apply equally to Sutpen’s own
trajectory—both are opportunists who in Haitian-coded spaces are able to advance their
material interests and statuses, but whose respective empires disintegrate through the ideological
foreclosure of succession. Both O’Neill’s play and Faulkner’s novel could be characterized in the
way Renda does the former: “a dramatic representation of the consequences of one man’s
imperial grab for power in the Caribbean” (187). The most crucial difference between the
protagonists of the two works is that of race—Jones is Black and Sutpen is white—while their
narrative methods are disparate: Absalom has likely never been said to possess “clarity and
simplicity of plot and language.”
The plot of The Emperor Jones centers on an African American man named Brutus
Jones, an escaped convict who, by claiming to be exclusively vulnerable to silver bullets, has
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O’Neill was Faulkner’s senior by nearly nine years.
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become the emperor of a Caribbean island. The play chiefly portrays the events which ensue
from when Jones, sensing an imminent coup against him, flees from his palace and undergoes
progressively worsening hallucinations that evoke the nightmarish “exotic primitivism” of the
Haitian setting. The signifier “Haiti” is absent from the play itself. However, as Renda points
out, O’Neill’s prefatory note to The Emperor Jones draws directly from James Wheldon
Johnson’s ironic title for his critical 1920 essay on the US occupation of Haiti: “SelfDetermining Haiti” (198). The note reads: “The action of the play takes place on an island in
the West Indies as yet not self-determined by White Marines. The form of native government
is, for the time being, an Empire” (O’Neill 3). This reference along with the playwright’s
extensive studies of Haitian history when writing the play documents the certainty that O’Neill
had Haiti in mind as the setting of The Emperor Jones.
Through Brutus Jones, O’Neill calls into question the stability of US American identity
as such. While racialized unambiguously as a “full-blooded negro,” Jones is also identified “with
American frontier masculinity” (Renda 204). As Faulkner writes, Jones is full of “swagger in his
egoism,” performing a version of the archetypal white American opportunist, lying his way into
becoming Emperor. Like the prefatory note which ironically allows White Marines to “selfdetermine” a foreign country, the equation of an African American character with “self-reliant
frontiersmen . . . opened up the troubling question, Who and what is an American?” (Renda
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206).32 In fact, Faulkner’s positioning of these character traits—Jones’s bravado, ruthlessness,
and self-reliance—in the white figure of Sutpen in Absalom, Absalom! functions as an imaginary
resolution to this specific contradiction.
Yet along with the elements which critique (racialized) national identity, imperialism,
and capitalism, The Emperor Jones also participates in an exoticism of Haitian space, thereby
colluding in similar imperialist mystifications to the ones Parry points out in Heart of Darkness.
The immanent contradictions of the text are coeval with the tension here between critique and
condonation. O’Neill presents the native people of the “West Indian island” as primitive dupes
of Jones who exemplify a “barbaric” culture: spears, chanting, drums, and depictions of
witchcraft are utilized throughout. Faulkner may have drawn inspiration from these exoticizing
elements of the play—for example, the following stage direction: “From the distant hills comes
the faint, steady thump of a tom-tom, low and vibrating. It starts at a rate exactly corresponding
to normal pulse beat—72 to the minute—and continues at a gradually accelerating rate from
this point uninterruptedly to the very end of the play” (22). O’Neill here figures the drum as an
aural symbol of the native people in pursuit of Jones and also as a heartbeat. The same conceit
appears in Absalom when Sutpen is “hearing the air tremble and throb at night with the drums
. . . not knowing that it was the heart of the earth itself he heard” (202). For both Faulkner and

Moreover, the play critiques the contradictions of capitalism which had been (and still are) severely racialized in
the US: “For de little stealin’ dey gits you jail soon or late. For de big stealin’ day makes you Emperor and puts you
de Hall o’ Fame when you croaks . . . If dey’s one thing I learns in ten years on de Pullman ca’s listenin’ to de white
quality talk, it’s dat same fact” (O’Neill 13). The incarceration of Black people for minor offenses and systemic
sanction of white-collar white offenders—it sounds all too familiar.
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O’Neill, then, the drum functions as a metaphor for indigenous resistance, designating such
resistance primitive and symbolically African even as it evokes the pivotal function of the Vodou
tradition for the Haitian Revolution.33
The Emperor Jones is a play that Renda regards as paradigmatic of how, during the US
military occupation, Haiti became “an object of cultural fascination—indeed, an object of
desire, a valuable commodity” (185). US imperialist intervention in Haiti had rendered it even
more available for appropriation as a space in which US Americans could negotiate the discursive
uncertainties of race and national identity. Said, paraphrasing the Haitian critic J. Michael Dash,
historicizes the spatial dynamic of this ideological affordance: “almost from the moment Haiti
gained its independence as a Black republic in 1803 Americans tended to imagine it as a void
into which they could pour their own ideas . . . [thus] the island and its people came to represent
degeneracy and of course racial inferiority” (289). The Haitian occupation’s coincidence with
the rise of mass culture in modernity simply allowed the “pouring” and dissemination of these
ideas to exponentially increase. The Emperor Jones, however, is more nuanced than the typical
(mis)representation of Haiti: much like Heart of Darkness and Absalom, Absalom! it is “a
complex and contradictory text . . . [that] conveyed a radical critique of imperialism as economic

33 Drums serve for Sutpen as a metaphor for the repeated repression required to stave off this resistance; see Chapter

1, pp. 23-24. The role of Vodou in the Haitian Revolution is complex, but it served to facilitate communication
among the enslaved as well as a syncretic cultural form through which people from many different African religious
and cultural traditions could find solidarity. Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes: “In the whirlwind of Saint-Domingue,
Vodou helped the class of slaves in two ways: it gave them more conviction to fight [and] it allowed them to organize
themselves” (“Fire” 30).
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exploitation even as it participated in the discourses of civilization and exotic primitivism”
(Renda 187).
Sutpen, Faulkner, and Spaces of Capitalist Development
However, suggesting direct causality between works, much less a semi-linear trajectory of
influence through Heart of Darkness, The Emperor Jones, and Absalom, Absalom! may be a
tendentious maneuver insofar as the tracing of influence can mystify the objective conditions in
which Conrad, O’Neill, and Faulkner worked out the correspondence of their spatial
projections and narrative mediations to actual manifestations of imperialism. As Fredric
Jameson writes of the comparison he draws between the work of Conrad and Sartre: “the
superficial similarity . . . ought to direct our attention first to the similarity of the social situations
and historical conditions in which, as symbolic gestures, they are meaningful” (259). Indeed,
Faulkner finds in Haiti a means by which to spatialize the relations of plantation capitalism and
source the rise of Sutpen there in order to represent an immanent development within the
capitalist mode of production—the transition from mercantilism to industrialism—which in
turn serves as allegory for the economic upheavals Faulkner himself experienced from in his own
lifetime.
The movement from mercantilism to industrialism is itself metonymized in the distinct
crops grown on the plantations to which Sutpen lays claim in Haiti and Mississippi, respectively.
In Haiti, sugar is absurdly profitable—“valuable pound for pound almost with silver ore” (AA
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202)—but the colonizing power claims absolute right to these profits: “The French, like every
other Government in those days, looked upon colonies as existing exclusively for the profit of
the metropolis. Known as the Mercantile system in English, the French called this economic
tyranny by a more honest name, the Exclusive” (James 46). The French bourgeoisie, whose
profits on sugar were limited by such regulation, of course resented the Exclusive, and when the
French Revolution eventually devolved into Bonapartism and the bourgeoisie secured power
for themselves, they abolished it in favor of free trade. By then, however, the Haitian Revolution
was already well underway, and France lost their primary sugar-producing colony. Nevertheless,
the rise of the bourgeoisie throughout Europe in the Age of Revolution spelled mercantilism’s
doom: industrialism was emerging. The sugar plantation in Haiti where Sutpen works as
overseer for a French planter thus would have already been a relic of a different stage of
capitalism by the 1820s, the decade in which Sutpen arrives there. However, given the presence
of slavery (not to mention the French), it presumably functions as a colony beholden to the
Exclusive. Yet when Sutpen abandons his wife, child, and holdings in Haiti and moves to
Mississippi (1831-1833, according to Absalom’s “Chronology” on p. 305), he becomes a planter
of cotton. Cotton, as Eric Williams writes, was “queen of the Industrial Revolution” and market
capitalism (83-84). In the 1830s, Sutpen rejoins historical record in planting what would have
been the most lucrative crop at the time, especially in Mississippi. What Faulkner does in the
novel, then, is situate Sutpen in two spaces—Haiti and Mississippi—that appear (despite and
because of historical record, respectively), through the relation of the crops grown there to the
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stages of capitalist development implied in these spaces, to be the two most profitable places in
the world to run a plantation.
In Mississippi, Sutpen becomes “the single biggest landowner and cotton-planter in the
county” (AA 56). However, the profits of his plantation, Sutpen’s Hundred, are associated with
the “wild” enslaved people he has brought with him to Jefferson. Rosa Coldfield notes when
first mentioning the “man-horse-demon” that “wild n—s” accompany him, and the
townspeople of Jefferson find the Haitian enslaved figures of preternatural menace (4).
Ultimately, they theorize that it is the Haitians who bring about the profits of Sutpen’s Hundred
by witchcraft (the allusion to Vodou here is practically unmissable): “[some people] believed
apparently that the wild n—s which [Sutpen] had brought there had the power to actually
conjure more cotton per acre from the soil than any tame one had ever done” (57). This power
is directly attributed to the African space from which the enslaved must have come via Haiti:
“anyone could look at those negroes of his and tell that they may have come (and probably did)
from a much older country than Virginia or Carolina but it wasn’t a quiet one” (11). The terror
which strikes the white citizens of Jefferson resonates with the abject fear that the white South
had of Haiti after the revolution and is reflected in Rosa’s characterizations of the enslaved as “a
good deal more deadly than any beast he could have started and slain in that country” (28), and
“human beings . . . of whom it was believed (or said) that they could creep up to a bedded buck
and cut its throat before it could move” (30). Moreover, this terror resembles closely the French
planter’s reaction to the imminent revolution: “what he took to be the planter’s gallic rage was
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actually fear, terror” (203). The success of Sutpen’s Hundred, by virtue of the presence and labor
of Haitians as well as its own spatial relation to Jefferson as an “island” (79), is still caught up
with the Sutpen’s experience in Haiti.
This success predicated on Sutpen’s movement from Haiti to Mississippi, which itself
depends on the correspondence between plantation spaces and crops which metonymize the
gains of mercantilism and industrialism, is the inverse image of the failure to which Faulkner was
a contemporary witness in the US South. During the 1930s, from his vantage point in a
peripheral region of the US, Faulkner lived through the Great Depression and registered the
Wall Street Crash of 1929 and ensuing recession as the result of the increasing dissolution of
“real” into “fictitious” capital rather than as the economic crises constitutive of capitalism.34 He
was thus aware of the shift within modernity of industrialism’s uneven movement from the core
to the periphery, but perhaps more so of the upheaval in the labor relations of Southern
agriculture caused by the New Deal’s Agricultural Adjustment Program.35 Faulkner most
immediately registered the US South as a (semi-)periphery in which archaic economic and social
forms antedating industrial capitalism persisted alongside modern forms. In Faulkner’s South,

Aboul-Ela writes: “where in one generation [Faulkner’s] family had transitioned from landed gentry to banking,
[he] then watched the South become increasingly urban and industrial, with economic development dependent on
Northern investment . . . Faulkner seems to have internalized this historical phenomenon early in life, as a sort of
class envy that manifested itself more in terms of spatial politics than in terms of traditional Marxist conceptions of
social class. As a consequence, he connected elite power centers with his incessant personal indebtedness” (5).
35 For an excellent gloss of this development, which effectively provided financial incentive for landowners to
abandon their obligations to sharecroppers, see Richard Godden’s William Faulkner: An Economy of Complex
Words pp. 2-4.
34

59

sharecropping and oral storytelling practices prevailed at the same time as mass logging and New
Critical literary movements (e.g. the Fugitives).36 This South, as an economic periphery,
simultaneously maintained its own residual relations and features along with the new “modern”
ones generally imported from the core—the “traditional” becomes legible as such through the
spatial inequalities within modernity. Flem Snopes in The Hamlet constitutes Faulkner’s
primary representation of a class specific to the modern periphery, one which Aboul-Ela terms
the comprador: this class “owns the means of production in a peripheral economy or occupies a
prime location in trade relations but almost inevitably does not see its fortunes as tied to its local
context” (70). In other words, the comprador maintains its status by funneling value from the
periphery to the core.
Yet it is Jason Compson in The Sound and the Fury (1929) who prefigures Snopes as the
typical subject of capitalist financialization. Jason, a man who steals from his niece in order to
invest in the stock market, avers that “money has no value; it’s just the way you spend it” (SF
194). This fetishistic disavowal of course only enables Jason to continue to treat money as if it
does have intrinsic value, a clear irony given his diegetic standpoint in 1928—one year prior to
the Crash. It seems congruent, then, that his denunciation of US imperialism is also fetishistic.

This school of writers, poets, and critics founded at Vanderbilt University included Robert Penn Warren, Allen
Tate, and John Crowe Ransom. The Fugitives, also associated with the Southern Agrarians, advocated for
resurgence in Southern art and literature, but were largely reactionary in their response to criticism of the South
(see their manifesto “I’ll Take My Stand”). Faulkner famously did not see eye to eye with the Fugitives, even though
they admired his work.
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In the wake of floods which have destroyed the cotton crops in which he has vested interest,
Jason exclaims: “Let it wash a man’s crop out of the ground year after year, and them up there
in Washington spending fifty thousand dollars a day keeping an army in Nicaragua or some
place” (234).37 By denouncing imperialist presence abroad, Jason disavows his own investment
in the US imperial intervention into foreign markets on which his financial speculations rely in
the first place. Nevertheless, through Jason, Faulkner depicts the spatial inequalities of
modernity here: the US government’s interest lie with the metropolitan core—metonymized by
“New York,” the exchange on which Jason consistently loses the money he steals—and with
their imperialist interventions in foreign states, not with the internal (semi-)peripheries like
Mississippi. Moreover, Jason’s exasperation with the cost of “an army in Nicaragua,” also
mediates an inability to conceive of totality.
Imperialism, Reification, and Totality
Imperialism itself may be understood as an ideological solution, or what Jameson calls a “strategy
of containment” (53), to the problem of social totality. As an organizational method,
imperialism constitutes a false “whole”—a world of empires—insofar as it reifies nation-states
and the relations between nation-states in order to make the capitalist world-system appear
internally coherent and objectively complete. This world-system, as a false totality, provides the

The US did indeed occupy Nicaragua—from 1909 to 1933—roughly around the same span of time as the
occupation of Haiti. Jason could well have bemoaned the cost of keeping Marines in the latter.
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ideological limits to narrative that Said senses in Heart of Darkness: “the almost oppressive force
of Marlow's narrative leaves us with a quite accurate sense that there is no way out of the
sovereign historical force of imperialism, and that it has the power of a system representing as
well as speaking for everything within its dominion” (24). The idea of “no way out” relies on the
constant repression of capital’s constitutive contradictions, like the combined unevenness that
capitalism produces rather than smooths away, “systematically and as a matter of course”
(WReC 12). However, working through these very contradictions allows for glimpses of
totality. Anna Kornbluh attests to this in her lucid definition of the term as:
an ensemble for organizing the whole of existence, and for reproducing that
constellation of relations into the future, that is marked by its contingency, its
incompletion, its possibility of being otherwise. Totality is not ‘all the things’—it is the
contradiction between a specific situation and other possibilities, and the principle of
thinking this contradiction at this level. (28)
It is by thinking contradiction, by working through the discontinuities or fissures within the
representable unity (such as an empire), that totality may emerge—but only insofar as the
contingency of this totality becomes apparent. For Lukács, for example, the standpoint of the
proletariat can access totality by virtue of its position in class society: it can “see society from the
centre, as a coherent whole” (HCC 69). Yet this access is exclusively possible through the
collective action of this class, which must simultaneously realize that class society has been the
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product of the proletariat’s collective action (its labor) all along and can therefore be
transformed into something different.
Reification, or the immanence of commodity logic to subjectivity and social forms,
forecloses the apprehension of totality. Indeed, mistakenly grasping totality as “all the things”
exemplifies reified consciousness: it reflects the domination of the quantitative and the
reduction of relations to an (ever expanding) network of particulars. Increasing reification is
coeval with modernization, and thus with modernity. The notion of imperialism exemplifies
the reification of geopolitics codified in an ideology, one which is inextricable from forms of
racism, orientalism, and, of course, nationalism. As abstractions, modernity and imperialism
both involve the preclusion of social totality by reification. Faulkner’s modernist form therefore
mediates both his lived experience from within a (semi-)periphery and the concomitant
impossibility of thinking totality from within the increasingly reified social relations of
modernity.38
The attempted reconstruction of the Sutpen story in Absalom, Absalom! is thus on the
level of form incapable of functioning as an allegory for the totality of Southern history,
especially as the reconstruction of this history means working through the modern capitalist and
imperialist developments (i.e. reification) contemporary to Faulkner. In order to conceive of the

Jameson historicizes the narrative form of Lord Jim similarly: “the objective preconditions of Conrad’s
modernism are to be found in the increasing fragmentation both of the rationalized external world and of the
colonized psyche alike” (236).
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South’s historical social formation—that is, its foundational violence and exploitation, and the
constitution of this historical space by its participation in colonialism and imperialism through
its material reliance on the labor of the enslaved—this history must be reified. Yet it remains
impossible to seal this false totality off from the other historical spaces and spatial relations
which make its very formation possible: the trans-Atlantic slave trade, imperialistic expansion
West, the rise of the British empire and its industrial textile production. The figure of Sutpen,
then, necessarily reflects the objective contradictions of imperialism for the South and the US
beyond these spaces in much the same way that Kurtz in Heart of Darkness reflects them beyond
the British empire: “All Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz” (Conrad 49). In Haiti,
Faulkner finds what Conrad had found in Africa: an exoticized space reminiscent of the colonial
past which has damned the present.
To open up the narrative to accommodate this space, the text fails to represent one
historical event which directly shows how this past could have been otherwise, an event which
concretizes how it once was possible to apprehend totality: the Haitian Revolution. The
enslaved Africans in Haiti, through their collective action, saw the entire constellation of
relations organized around their labor and realized its contingency by engaging in the struggle
to transform this totality. The dialectic between their thought and action built solidarity
between multivarious African pasts and the organizations of society therein, thereby collapsing
the cultural divisions among them in order to actualize freedom within the space of Haiti. The
Haitian Revolution thus constitutes what Walter Benjamin calls a monad: “Where thinking
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suddenly stops in a constellation pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by
which it crystallizes into a monad” (207). A monad is a “concentration of historical totality”
(Löwy 95). By eliminating this monad from the narrative space of Haiti, Faulkner allows for an
ideological distortion which encompasses the whole of Absalom, Absalom! and locates the
antinomies of colonialism and imperialism in the plot of Sutpen. However, this specific
contradiction between Haitian history and imperialist ideology also opens up the interpretative
space necessary to understand the novel dialectically, through Benjamin’s famous formulation:
“a document of culture . . . at one and the same time a document of barbarism” (200).
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3

‘that meagre and fragile thread’: Narrative and Language

In interpreting Absalom, Absalom! as a document, it becomes necessary to attend to both its
structure and language as a novel. The novel, as a literary form, corresponds to the objective
epistemological limitations of modernity which, as discussed in the previous chapter, are also
inextricable from imperialism. The contradiction between representation and social totality
dialectically gives rise to the novel form. As Lukács writes in Theory of the Novel (1915): “The
novel is the epic of an age in which the extensive totality of life is no longer directly given, in
which the immanence of meaning in life has become a problem, yet which still thinks in terms
of totality” (56). Lukács here has in mind the nineteenth-century realist novel, but his claim
holds equally true for Faulkner’s modernist novel. Given Lukács’s famously dogmatic criticism
of modernism (and his debates with Theodor Adorno on the matter), the following may seem a
strange assertion: had he read Faulkner, he may have discovered present in his work a mediation
of objective conditions similar to that which he lauds in Dostoevsky. On the latter, he writes:
“‘Suddenly’ there appeared from an underdeveloped country, where the troubles and conflicts
of contemporary civilization could not yet have been fully unfolded, works that stated—
imaginatively—all the problems of human culture at its highest point” (“Dostoevsky” 146). As
the WReC claims, “Lukács heralds Dostoevsky’s social location as fundamental to his ability to
invent a new form that . . . gestures to the actuality of capitalism as an unevenly integrated worldsystem” (61). Furthermore, “Dostoevsky is able to parlay the sense of backwardness and
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incongruity into a source of literary innovation . . . processing the co-presence of the archaic and
the new into a modern form that has few parallels elsewhere in nineteenth-century literary
space” (62). Again, the (semi-)peripheral position which Faulkner occupies in the US South
proves to be crucial for understanding the form and content of his work. If Dostoevsky depicts
the incongruity of the urban, then Faulkner certainly limns the backwardness of the rural. 39 Yet
Lukács’ notion that the former’s work traverses cultural points (from low to high) resonates
with how the latter’s also embeds the low in a prose style which aspires to modernist heights of
aesthetic experimentation and autonomy.
Although Faulkner held a small but influential French readership—Jean-Paul Sartre
among them—the currency of his work abroad was never that of Joyce or Proust, at least until
a resurgence of interest in his work in the 1940s. Fellow modernists tended to dismiss him as
provincial and aesthetically clumsy—Wyndham Lewis, for one, mocked Faulkner’s verbose
prose style and supposed propensity for melodrama, deeming him “a moralist with a corn-cob”
(64).40 By the time Absalom appeared in 1936, “modernism,” in its Eurocentric conception, was
already somewhat on the wane. However, Faulkner’s novel manages to embody a culmination
of the modernist project by at the same time admitting its failure—admitting, moreover, the

The literary traditions of both Russia and the US South have had to negotiate the unevenness of capitalist
development and starkness of spatial inequality, especially insofar as the peasant class is impacted. Southern writers
such as Walker Percy and Flannery O’Connor have cited the influence of Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Gogol, etc.
40 Interestingly, Lewis also notes: “More than half of [Faulkner’s] text belongs, as far as the genre of the writing is
concerned, to the ‘psychological’ method of Conrad (or the translations of the great nineteenth-century Russian
authors)” (44).
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failure of the novel form itself. The plot of Absalom, as Peter Brooks has noted, “both sums up
the nineteenth-century tradition of the novel—particularly its concern with genealogy,
authority, and patterns of transmission—while subverting it, working this subversion in a
manner that reaffirms a traditional set of problems for the novel while disallowing its traditional
solutions” (286). Faulkner’s novel thus cancels (Aufheben) the traditional novel’s “equations of
consanguinity, property, ambition, and eros” while nonetheless maintaining them as “a
backdrop, an equation that ultimately doesn’t add up” (302). Sutpen’s own “design” is the most
obvious manifestation of this equation, but Charles Bon also “appears as the hero of romance
with a simpler and more absolute design”: he vies for Sutpen’s recognition (302). Yet while
Absalom, Absalom! is “modernist” insofar as it is the dialectical mirror-image of nineteenth
century realism, it is still not modernist in the sense of the modernism which Adorno sees as
possessing an immanent aesthetic capacity to resist modernization. Little in Faulkner’s work
suggests active resistance to modernization or commodification; indeed, he sometimes wrote in
ways which he regarded as inferior and sensationalist (e.g. the “potboiler” novel Sanctuary and
the Hollywood screenplays he co-authored) in order to make money. Nevertheless, Absalom
exemplifies a modernism of which it is necessary to think, with the WReC, as the registration of
the combined unevenness of capitalist development. In other words, the disjunctions within and
between simultaneous forms of social existence, inequalities which inhere in capital’s uneven
integration of a world-system, are registered and mediated by the disjunctive form(s) of art
created at the margins of this system. This understanding of modernism therefore upends the
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usual assumptions of its periodization (the early 20th century) and localization (Western
Europe), opening up interpretation of novels produced within a capitalist world-system as
world-literature and their formal peculiarities as irrealist:
Anti-linear plot lines, meta-narratorial devices, un-rounded characters, unreliable
narrators, contradictory points of view, and so on, have all been identified as the
techniques and devices characteristic of the distinctive (and restricted) Euro-American
literary formation typically addressed under the name of ‘modernism.’ But we
understand these techniques and devices more broadly as the determinate formal
registers of (semi-)peripherality in the world-literary system, discernible wherever
literary works are composed that mediate the lived experience of capitalism’s
bewildering creative destruction (or destructive creation). (WReC 51)
Perhaps even Lukács would have been more receptive to such a “modernism,” despite his
Eurocentrism.
It is in this world-literary, irrealist sense that Absalom, and Faulkner’s oeuvre in general,
should be read. Doing so facilitates readings of imperial spatial relations like those examined in
Chapter 2, and of temporal-historical contingencies and ruptures like those discussed in
Chapter 1. In Absalom these of course dovetail with understanding the Haitian Revolution as a
temporal rupture and concentration of totality—a world-historical event. However, it is also
necessary to historicize the novel as a genre within this context. As Susan Buck-Morss writes: “If
on the one hand, the anomalies of the Haitian experience are seen as its progressive moments,
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on the other hand, the brutalities of slavery prove to be historically routine” (149). The novel,
as a modern form, participates in these brutalities: “the history of Caribbean society is that of a
dual relation between plantation and [novelistic] plot” (Wynter 99). Sylvia Wynter writes
predominantly about Caribbean literature, but her point remains that the novel as such is
constituted by the taint of plantation slavery. The narrative form of Absalom is not an exception
to this historicity, but neither is it uncritical of the taint it bears. The narrative of sovereignty
and lineage which Sutpen attempts to write for himself through his ascendancy to planter status
ultimately proves as untenable as the various attempts to reconstruct his story. Indeed, Absalom
can be read as a reflexive deconstruction of the novel, or a novelization of the impossibility of
narrative. However, the condition of possibility for this novelization of the impossibility of
narrative is that its absent center (Sutpen’s story) does not, or cannot, signify the Haitian
Revolution. Therefore, this essay contends that Absalom is certainly a novel about the instability
of narration, the inseparability of the text from the act of reading it, and history itself as such a
narration and such a text. Yet the singular narrative structure of the novel also corresponds to its
repression, ideological foreclosure, or negation of the Haitian Revolution in the text. Both as an
aesthetic accomplishment and theory of language (narrative, plot, signification, etc.), Absalom
functions through this failure, which is not quite an “erasure” because it does not efface
revolution in Haiti completely—rather, it maintains it as the point of negativity around which
the story of Sutpen coheres.
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Negativity, Signification, and World-History
In the latter half of the 20th century, Faulkner criticism turned from the New Critical
interpretative methods epitomized by Cleanth Brooks to post-structuralist readings. The most
influential of these are arguably John T. Matthews’ The Play of Faulkner’s Language (1982),
Andre Bleikasten’s The Ink of Melancholy (1990), and Edouard Glissant’s Faulkner Mississippi
(1996). None of these works address the absence of the Haitian Revolution in Absalom,
Absalom!, although Matthews would later write his 2004 article on the matter after it finally rose
to prominence in scholarly circles. However, in retrospect these seminal readings of Faulkner
seem to provide ample space for this absence to have been theorized, particularly Matthews’ and
Glissant’s. The former admits that “[i]deas, conceptions, the facts of the past, and so on are never
fully recovered by language in Faulkner” (PFL 30), while the latter sees that “Sutpen tried to
establish himself in Haiti (his choice of both country and time was poor, the Haitian Revolution
had already taken place) and found himself faced with the most radical impossibility of all: that
of mixed blood” (110). Importantly, these near-misses are somewhat theoretically proximate to
a framework which might more conclusively theorize the absence of the Revolution: Lacanian
psychoanalysis.41 Instead of the endless “sliding” of signification, the celebration of particularity,
and the assignment of causality, a Lacanian hermeneutic prioritizes the negativity at the heart of
the symbolic order, the universal, and constitutive lack. While somewhat of a tautology, it is

Broadly speaking, Matthews’ study is deconstructivist (à la Derrida) while Glissant’s utilizes some Deleuzian
methods and concepts, particularly the rhizome. Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze were, of course, famous
theoretical interlocutors with Jacques Lacan.
41
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through the negative that the absence of the Haitian Revolution in the novel can be thoroughly
assessed, if not precisely understood.
Joan Copjec has provided sharp critiques of the deconstructivist view of signification
and subjectivity, but her two most relevant points here are those which address the former.
Rather than seeing the real as enmeshed in a web of signification and endlessly deferred, Copjec
sees representation positioned differently: “Lacan is certainly not offering an agnostic
description of the way the real object is cut off from the subject’s view by language, of the way
the real object escapes capture in the network of signifiers . . . [contra Derrida] Lacan argues,
rather, that beyond the signifying network . . . there is, in fact, nothing at all” (Copjec 35).
Lacan’s own aphorism “There is no metalanguage” sums this point up nicely. However, the
deeper underlying issue is that deconstruction (and poststructuralism more generally) refuses to
think totality while nonetheless basing its own conceptual integrity upon it. Jameson shows how
“such perceptions . . . must be accompanied by some initial appearance of continuity, some
ideology of unification already in place, which it is their mission to rebuke and shatter . . . [and
thus] reconfirm the status of the concept of totality by their very reaction against it” (53). This
reaction usually appears as a form of the idea that the “notion of the whole . . . always disguises
the infinite play of difference” (Copjec 59). Yet totality is nevertheless inscribed into the infinite
sliding of signification because of the paradox which Copjec unveils:
only a closed totality can be considered infinite; only a limit guarantees that the
production of meaning will continuously be subject to revision, never ending. Rather
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than baring the device of difference behind the illusion of totality, Lacanian theory
reverses these terms and shows the infinite play of difference to be dependent on a limit,
a closed totality. (60)
The limits of a novel, for instance, seal its narrative(s) into a totality which allows for the
continuous generation of meaning. The limit itself therefore implies closure and infinite
signification. As Lukács claims, the novel continues to think totality both despite and because
of the attenuation of meaning in life concomitant with the increasing lack of immediate relation
to social totality. If the novel fashions a totality, such a concentration of totality (i.e. monad) as
the Haitian Revolution would be absent because it exceeds the novel’s own limitations.
As previously discussed, Absalom, Absalom! mediates the Haitian Revolution for
Sutpen as the absent cause of a primary trauma (recall his aversion to sugar, for example).42 The
relation between absence and trauma here situates the Revolution in the Lacanian order of the
Real, outside of the Symbolic. Lacan describes the Real as “‘that which is always in the same
place,’ as the ‘excluded’ Thing that is ‘at the heart of me; as something strange to me,’ the
‘prehistoric Other that it is impossible to forget’ or to remember” (qtd. in George 76). The Real
also corresponds directly to the “unthinkability” of the Haitian Revolution which MichaelRolph Trouillot has articulated. Within a symbolic structure historically determined by the
objective forms of social existence—in this case, plantation capitalism—a revolution of the

42

See Chapter 1, p. 21.
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Black enslaved cannot be symbolized. Yet the US South’s profound fear of this event, its
historical encounter with the Real, in fact constitutes “the South” as a signifier.
W. E. B. Du Bois, in his early work The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the
United States (1896), a study based on his Harvard doctoral dissertation, describes this political
fallout of the Haitian Revolution in the US as “a wave of horror and fear [that] swept over the
South” (71). This wave, then, tokens a movement of reaction to the event that resembles the
movement of its (non)signification, its refusal of the symbolic. The South, in turn, attempts to
signify itself through the negation of what is already absent. As a master signifier (S1), or a
signifier without any clear signified, “the South” slides endlessly—much in the way
deconstruction theorizes. However, “the South” finds its point de capiton, or “quilting point,”
in “the North,” itself another master signifier—it can then appear comprehensible, though not
completely. Yet the achievement of this act of signification relies upon the absence of the missing
signifier (S2). This signifier must remain absent in order for the symbolic order to constitute
itself. It will soon become apparent how the actual history of the South vis-à-vis the Haitian
Revolution and the absence of the Revolution in Absalom, Absalom! are legible through this
heuristic. In the former instance, during and immediately after the Revolution, the Southern
states passed numerous legislative acts which restricted immigration and the importation of
enslaved people. Du Bois later notes, in Black Reconstruction (1935), how “the whole white
South became an armed and commissioned camp to keep Negroes in slavery and to kill the black
rebel” (12). A contemporary observer of the US Civil War named Karl Marx also saw clearly the
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symbolic constitution of the South: “It is not a country at all, but a battle slogan” (55).
Historically, the South absents (or represses) the memory of the Haitian Revolution by
arranging and constituting itself so that, in theory, this event could not happen there. The
symbolic impossibility of a slave revolution in the South is thus inscribed in the Real—the
Haitian Revolution becomes its absent signifier.
As Copjec claims, “in order for the symbolic to evict the real and thereby establish itself,
a judgment of existence is required; that is, it is necessary to say that the real is absented, to declare
its impossibility” (121). In the actual history of the South, this declaration is evident—but is this
also the case in Absalom? In the novel, Sutpen “went out and subdued” the enslaved and thus
quells the revolution. The narrative thereby provides a symbolic reversal of the Haitian
Revolution in order to situate it within the Real. Accordingly, the successful Revolution, as the
absent signifier, allows for the novel to mediate a version of the ideological fantasy in which the
actual South historically engaged: that the Haitian Revolution could not have occurred there.
Therefore, the preoccupation of Absalom’s narrators with understanding the history of the
South through the story of Sutpen cannot be severed from the possibility, however superficially
effaced, of a specifically Haitian resistance to the story they tell.43

This preoccupation is omnipresent. Rosa Coldfield wants the story of Sutpen told (by Quentin) so that an
audience can know “why God let us lose the War”(6). Shreve’s fascination with the South also signals to the reader
that Sutpen’s narrative is ultimately about the South. He asks Quentin: “Tell about the South. What’s it like there.
What do they do there. Why do they live there. Why do they live at all” (142). Later, in response to the story, Shreve
exclaims: “Jesus, the South is fine, isn’t it. It’s better than the theatre, isn’t it” (176). Finally, at the novel’s end, he
says: “The South. Jesus. No wonder you folks all outlive yourselves by years and years and years” (301).
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The Lacanian emphasis on negativity not only allows for an understanding of the
Haitian Revolution as an absent signifier, but also elaborates on how the Black enslaved
constitute the negativity within the (plantation) capitalist system itself. When Alenka Zupančič
extends the Lacanian non-relation to the political sphere as a “bias” or non-neutrality of social
being, she arrives at Marx’s critique of political economy: “Marx saw it perfectly: in order for
the non-relation to be economically productive and profitable, it has to be built into the very
mode of production” (33). Zupančič then comes to a Hegelian insight couched in Lacanian
terms: “the proletariat is not simply one of the social classes, but rather names the point of the
concrete constitutive negativity in capitalism, the point of the non-relation obfuscated and
exploited by it. The proletariat is not the sum of all workers, it is the concept that names the
symptomatic point of this system, its disavowed and exploited negativity” (34). It therefore
becomes clear that for the plantation capitalist system the enslaved are the symptomatic point.
Indeed, both C. L. R. James and W. E. B. Du Bois emphasize the resemblance of the enslaved to
a proletariat: the former claims that the enslaved of Saint-Domingue “working and living
together in gangs of hundreds on the huge sugar-factories which covered the North Plain . . .
were closer to a modern proletariat than any group of workers in existence at the time” (86); the
latter refers to the enslaved as “the black worker” in order to foreground this laborer as the
“founding stone of a new economic system in the nineteenth century and for the modern world,
who brought civil war in America” (BR 15). The proletariat—workers sell their labor power as
a commodity—and the enslaved—workers whose very being is reduced to a labor-power
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commodity (and its reproduction)—occupy the same symptomatic point of capitalism which
Zupančič describes, but together they also represent a split within the symptom. This split is
maintained both through the pervasiveness of racist ideology, and how the system of slavery
itself becomes split into the objective conditions of oppression that persist: Jim Crow, the
carceral state, etc. However, the Haitian revolutionaries present a singular historical instance via
their embodiment of the exploited negativity within the system. They possessed what Hegel would
call “necessity,” that which Robespierre and the Jacobins ultimately lost: “Hegel’s critique of
Jacobinism relies on the undoubtedly correct supposition that they did not understand
themselves to be the historic embodiment of absolute negativity” (López 325). Yet the Haitian
enslaved, who James famously calls the Black Jacobins, crucially possessed this selfunderstanding that the French Jacobins themselves did not.44
Narrating History
It thus seems oddly congruent that Absalom inscribes the Haitian’s self-conscious historical
embodiment of absolute negativity as the negative point within the narrative of Sutpen. In doing
so, the novel itself admits a certain contingency to signification and thus also to historiography.
This vexation of narrative clarity and authority has not escaped notice. Brooks, echoing similar
claims made by Matthews and Bleikasten, writes that in Absalom “ultimately narrative itself is

To be clear, absolute negativity entails freedom from any final determination—a radical uncertainty and
incompletion. Absolute Spirit in its absolute negativity is the very opposite of the resolution of all contradiction
and a state of rest at the end of some linear telos, despite the ubiquity of this (mis)reading of Hegel.
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the problem” (290). According to Matthews, Absalom, Absalom! is “Faulkner’s most
accomplished, moving, and sustained meditation on the act of fabricating meaning” (PFL 115).
History and language are both complicit in such fabrication: they frustrate all attempts to access
“what really happened” but create meaning anyway. In the novel, Mr. Compson explicates this
frustration, or, rather, the frustrative capacity of signification and historiography:
It’s just incredible. It just does not explain. Or perhaps that’s it: they dont explain and
we are not supposed to know . . . They are there, yet something is missing; they are like
a chemical formula exhumed along with the letters from that forgotten chest, carefully,
the paper old and faded and falling to pieces, the writing faded, almost indecipherable,
yet meaningful, familiar in shape and sense, the name and presence of volatile and
sentient forces; you bring them together in the proportions called for, but nothing
happens; you re-read, tedious and intent, poring, making sure that you have forgotten
nothing, made no miscalculation; you bring them together again and again nothing
happens: just the words, the symbols, the shapes themselves, shadowy inscrutable and
serene, against that turgid background of a horrible and bloody mischancing of human
affairs. (AA 80)
Matthews suggests that the narrators of Absalom—the cynical Mr. Compson perhaps more than
the others—are aware of “the impossibilities of conclusive accounting and the need to proceed
with speculative fabrication anyhow” (PFL 119). Historiography remains necessary, then, as an
symbolic act that emplots a series of events and imbues them with meaning in a narrative. Yet
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this process does not proceed like a chemistry experiment; to borrow Mr. Compson’s metaphor:
using a “formula” does not work. Assembling the available texts and “bring[ing] them together
in the proportions called for” does not make immediate sense of the “horrible and bloody
mischancing of human affairs.” Still, this is not to say that no sense is made at all; rather, what
signifies is simply constituted by what is already absent, as well as by what is left out or could be
emplotted differently.
Paraphrasing Claude Lévi-Strauss, Hayden White writes: “We can construct a
comprehensible story of the past . . . only by a decision to ‘give up’ one or more of the domains
of facts offering themselves for inclusion in our accounts. Our explanations of historical
structures and processes are thus determined more by what we leave out of our representations
than by what we put in” (90). White’s insistence on the historical text as a literary artifact, that
“history has no stipulatable subject matter uniquely its own; it is always written as part of a
contest between contending poetic figurations of what the past might consist of” (98), figures
historiography as a dialectical process analogous to that of literary creation: the fictive and the
real both achieve “sense” for the writer and reader via the same forms and constructions. The
Black Jacobins and Black Reconstruction in America exemplify this well—through these
historical studies, James and Du Bois respectively redress the emplotments of Black history by
white French and US historians, and situate their own narratives against them. They make
explicit through material analyses both the Romantic transcendence of the enslaved’s successes
and the tragic trajectories of bourgeois greed and reactionary backlash. Thus, through
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historiography, “knowledge of the past may increase incrementally, [even if] our understanding
of it does not (White 89, my italics).
Unraveling the Narrative: Framing the Haitian Revolution
If narrative is indeed a socially symbolic act, then Absalom, Absalom! contains several such acts
to unravel. The novel contains both frames and layers of narrative (to distinguish between the
two in spatial terms: the former encompasses a narrative within it, the latter sits atop another),
and there are several narrators possessing distinct motives for attempting to tell Sutpen’s story.
Nevertheless, the investment these narrators share in Sutpen’s story allows for a single voice to
run through the novel: “every reader notices that the tellings are not set off by wholly
individualized voices. Tones, emphases, topics, and manners may differ, but there is an essential
sameness to the baroque prolixity, the nightmarish breathlessness, and the Latinate
polysyllabism of the novel” (Matthews PFL 121). Moreover, there is only one point of access to
the story Sutpen tells about himself and his time in Haiti: Chapter 7. This chapter is layered on
three or four levels: Quentin narrates to Shreve (and the reader) according to the version of the
story Sutpen has told Grandfather Compson, though Quentin himself has perhaps received this
tale through Mr. Compson.45 It seems possible, then, that a mediated version of Sutpen’s own

The (possible) layering of the story of Sutpen’s origins in Chapter 7: Sutpen — General Compson — Mr.
Compson — Quentin — Shreve/the reader. However, Quentin repeatedly interjects “Grandfather said” into the
narrative, so it remains possible that he heard the story directly from General/Grandfather Compson—but equally
likely that he repeats this to emphasize what Mr. Compson identified as Grandfather Compson’s own elaborations
and comments on the story.
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voice accounts for a quotient of the “sameness” which Matthews finds running through the
novel— the “baroque prolixity” noted by the latter matches the former’s routine use of
“bombastic phrases” (AA 194). Nevertheless, the peculiar manner in which Sutpen abruptly
launches into the Haitian portion of the story strikes Grandfather Compson as one which
strains toward a calm objectivity:
he telling it all over and still it was not absolutely clear—the how and the why he was
there and what he was—since he was not talking about himself. He was telling a story.
He was not bragging about something he had done; he was just telling a story about
something a man named Thomas Sutpen had experienced, which would still have been
the same story if the man had had no name at all, if it had been told about any man or
no man over whiskey at night. (199)
Before examining the affect (or lack thereof) with which Sutpen imbues his narrative, the
framing of this narrative “over whiskey at night” deserves note for how it informs the story it
contains. Compson and Sutpen are sitting beside a campfire near a swamp and drinking
whiskey, taking a break from their pursuit of the French architect, the only other person Sutpen
initially brings to Mississippi besides himself and the enslaved Haitians. Sutpen recruits the
architect from Martinique to design the plantation house on the hundred acres he acquires
outside Jefferson—what will become known as “Sutpen’s Hundred.”46 This architect runs away

46

In designing the plantation house, the architect “manage[s] to curb the dream of grim and castlelike
magnificence at which Sutpen obviously aimed” (29). In other words, he keeps Sutpen from having a house which
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from the building project into the swamp “in the second summer, when they had finished all
the brick and had the foundations laid” (177). His motivations for doing so likely stem from his
dissatisfaction with the circumstances under which he works. Compson claims that the contrast
between his “formal coat and his Paris hat” and the wilderness with which he is surrounded
symbolizes his “amazement . . . at the inexplicable and incredible fact of his own presence” (28).
Regardless, once he finds the architect gone, Sutpen gathers Compson and other neighbors, and
makes the enslaved men track the fleeing Frenchman.
This frame narrative thus engages two historical paradigms at once: pursued by a posse
into a swamp, the fugitive white architect is in the position of an escaped enslaved Black person;
however, in recalling that his trackers are themselves from Haiti, this chase also comes to
resemble the dynamic between the Haitian revolutionaries and the French planters. Moreover,
the visual stimulus for Sutpen’s first attempt to talk about his time in Haiti (he tells the story of
his upbringing in Virginia on the first day of the chase) is the sight of the enslaved carrying pine
knot torches: “the n—s . . . with their pine torches smoking and flaring above them and the red
light” (AA 198). A phantasmagoric relation between the presence and absence of the enslaved
unsettles both Grandfather Compson and Sutpen as they see “shadows . . . at one moment then
gone the next though you knew all the time that they were still there because you could feel them
with your breathing” (198). Then, suddenly, Sutpen begins “talking about it again, telling him

would reflect the grotesque proportions of his outsized ambition. The significance of the plantation house in the
novel is worthy of future study.
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again before he realised that this was some more of it” (198). The referent of “it” here is the story
of Sutpen’s life before Mississippi, while the “more” turns out to be the revolution Sutpen
suppresses in Haiti. By reading this passage with Haiti in mind, it seems obvious that Sutpen
relates his story to Compson as an attempt to stave off the fear the sight of the Haitian enslaved
(especially in connection with fire) continues to engender in him. Therefore, Sutpen dissociates
from his own story in the act of telling it—“he was not talking about himself” (199)—in order
to consign to the Real the continued possibility of slave revolution, the negation which
constitutes the symbolic act of his narrative.
It would also be a mistake to ignore the tension between the diegetic orality of the
narration (as a precapitalist, pre-novel form of storytelling) and the objective textuality of
Absalom as a novel. As another way in which Faulkner registers the combined unevenness of
modernization in the (semi-)peripheries, the coexistence of oral tradition with modernist
literature also brings into question how the mode of historiographic invention might matter.
Does the fact that Sutpen tells Grandfather Compson about Haiti “over whiskey at night” while
sitting around a campfire signify a different narrative potentiality in comparison to the written
narration of history? Indeed, all the narrators of Absalom tell the story to another person out
loud—except for Charles Bon’s letter to Judith, nothing is written down. However, both
written and oral narration involve emplotment of events within a form. This form, then, is what
might vary. Sutpen thus tells his story as a “campfire story,” a kind of legend (or myth), and he
decides where the story begins and ends based on his perception of Compson’s receptivity to it.
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When he stops, Sutpen “just stopped, Grandfather said, flat and final like that, like that was all
there was, all there could be to it, all of it that made good listening from one man to another over
whiskey at night. Maybe it was” (AA 205).
Quentin’s frame narrative goes on, however—and the resolution of the escaped French
architect plot still signifies in relation to the repression of the Haitian Revolution.
Reconciliation with the French architect comes when Sutpen’s posse of slaveholders and the
enslaved trap the former in a cave by a river. When the architect finally relents and tacitly agrees
to return to Sutpen’s Hundred, Grandfather Compson describes seeing “eyes in the gaunt face,
the eyes desperate and hopeless but indomitable too, invincible too, not beaten yet by a damn
sight . . . just a will to endure and a foreknowing of defeat but not beat yet by a damn sight” (AA
207). Compson’s repetition here—that the French architect is “not beaten by a damn sight . . .
not beat yet by a damn sight” clearly evokes another repeated statement of resilience in Absalom:
the Confederate lost cause as summarized in Wash Jones’s refrain: “they ain’t whupped us yet,
air they?,” which first appears on page 150 but recurs five times in the novel.47 The reconciliation
between the Southern planters and the French architect in the symbolic “lost cause” context
indicates their shared bond: both represent the forces that have fought and lost (in the Haitian

Jones is described in the “Genealogy” as: “Squatter, residing in an abandoned fishing camp belonging to
Thomas Sutpen, hanger-on of Sutpen, handy man about Sutpen’s place while Sutpen was away between ‘61-’65”
(308). “They ain’t whupped us yet, air they?” functions as Jones’ “catchphrase,” in a sense—it repeatedly strains
to identify him, a poor white, with what he imagines to be the nobility and perseverance of the Southern planter
aristocrats (i.e. Sutpen) leading the Confederacy, who are ultimately fighting to uphold the form of capitalism in
which Jones’s class position is at least better than that of the enslaved. See Faulkner’s short story “Wash” (1934)
for the very first appearance of Thomas Sutpen within the Yoknapatawpha Extended Universe.
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Revolution) and will fight and lose (in the US Civil War) to the forces of Black emancipation.
Furthermore, the refusal to acknowledge defeat tokens the continuation of violence, the whites’
perpetual reaction to Black emancipation even after it has been realized.
Of course, this refusal also relates directly to the contingency of historiography, and thus
to the contingency of language as well. Returning to Mr. Compson’s claim—his finding that
“the words, the symbols, the shapes themselves” are what “does not explain” (AA 80)—with
Haiti in mind illuminates some of the ideological presuppositions at stake therein. The shapes
of language are “shadowy inscrutable serene,” a combination of descriptors that evokes the
figure of Charles Bon, who is deemed “shadowy” in many instances throughout the novel.
Indeed, Bon is linked directly to the phantasmagoric, in a way obviously similar to the Haitian
enslaved: “shadowy: a myth, a phantom: something which they engendered and created whole
themselves, some effluvium of Sutpen blood and character, as though as a man he did not exist
at all” (82). It is hardly an original claim that Bon, the child disowned and abandoned by Sutpen
because of the possibility that his mother (the daughter of the French planter in Haiti) is a
woman of color, embodies the return of the repressed in the novel. Yet more than just
miscegenation fear, the repressed which Bon represents can also be characterized as the Creole.48
Through the significance of the Creole as a comingling of forms unique to the New World,

Bon hails from New Orleans (via Haiti), and the narrators (particularly Mr. Compson) ascribe a certain
contradictory, fluid, and decadent essence to this city which code it heavily as Creole: “foreign and paradoxical,
with its atmosphere at once fatal and languorous, at once feminine and steel-hard” (86). For Shreve’s speculative
insight into Bon’s ambivalent relationship to Haiti, see Absalom, p. 239.
48
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Absalom’s negation of the Haitian Revolution, the latter itself being an emphatically Creole
enterprise, informs the theories of language espoused by the characters.49
The Creole and the Real
From the historical standpoint of 1910, the Creole Caribbean appears to Quentin and Shreve as
the imperial playground of the US. Thus, when Shreve refers to Charles Bon’s home as “that
Porto Rico or Haiti or wherever it was” (AA 239), this “innocence” of an exact signifier attests
to the lack of care and attention paid to the subjugated nations of this region. 50 Indeed, the
choice of the Anglicized spelling “Porto” as opposed to “Puerto” ensues directly from the
transfer of the colony into the possession of the US in the Spanish-American War (1899)—the
US changed the spelling from the latter to the former in the Treaty of Paris agreement with
Spain, and maintained it until the people of Puerto Rico successfully advocated for its reversal
in 1931. That Faulkner makes sure his 1936 novel does not use a spelling anachronistic to
Shreve’s moment might speak to how cognizant of the Caribbean he may have been. However,
while writing one particular passage in Absalom, Absalom!, Faulkner struggled to spell “Haitian”
correctly: the revisions of the manuscript show him using “Hataiean” and “Haitiean” in two
separate drafts before finally arriving at “Haitian” (Langford 262). In the US, the spelling of
Haiti had been “Hayti” until the 1880s, but this does not account for Faulkner’s repeated

See Dubois’s Avengers of the New World, p. 34 for a definition of “creole” contemporary to the Haitian
Revolution.
50 Recall also how finicky Shreve is about “West Virginia” in contrast. See Chapter 1, pp. 10-11.
49
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mistakes—there is no confusion here between “y” and “i.” Nor does he seem to have made this
spelling error anywhere else in the text. To place this instance of “Haitian” in its specific context:
“[Sutpen] and the father fired at no enemy but at the Haitian night itself, lancing their little vain
and puny flashes into the brooding and blood-weary and throbbing darkness” (AA 204). Then,
four lines down from this passage, Sutpen ends the revolution—he has “[gone] out and subdued
them” (204). Faulkner’s struggle with the signifier Haitian—in the full context of his
intentional spelling of “Porto Rico,” the opacity of Black-coded space in the passage, and
Sutpen’s imminent suppression of the revolution—likely results from his apprehension
(whether conscious or unconscious) while writing it that a repression of the Real of this
signifier’s most famous collocation was nigh: the Haitian Revolution.
The tension exemplified in this evident grappling with the signifier also relates to the
Real of the Creole in the novel. Charles Bon embodies both the Haitian other and unknowable
Creole identity that Sutpen fears most. For a “design” hatched on the ideological basis of
specifically white grandeur, the prospect of racial admixture is tantamount to failure.51 Yet
ironically it is the Creole language which Sutpen learns and utilizes to further his plan. If
Sutpen’s Creole, as Glissant suggests, “represents the very thing he wants to kill in himself” (84),
it is still the very thing which enables his design to work at all: in Haiti “he discovered . . . he

Sutpen certainly perceives this. When confronted with the prospect of Bon marrying his daughter, Judith, he
sees two possibilities: 1) “destroy my design with my own hand” or 2) “let matters take the course which I know
they will take and see my design complete itself quite normally and naturally and successfully to the public eye, yet
to my own in such fashion as to be a mockery and betrayal of that little boy who approached that door fifty years
ago and was turned away and for whose vindication the whole plan was conceived” (220).
51
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would have to learn to speak a new language, else that design to which he dedicated himself
would die still-born” (AA 200). By learning Haitian Creole and French, Sutpen becomes able to
use language as a tool by which he can control the enslaved and can access the French planter
(and his daughter). This specific enterprise is the only information Sutpen gives about the time
which elapses between his setting out for the Caribbean and the revolution on the plantation:
“the only mention he ever made to those six or seven years which must have existed somewhere,
must have actually occurred, was about the patois he had to learn in order to oversee the
plantation, and the French he had to learn, maybe not to get engaged to be married, but which
he would certainly need to be able to repudiate the wife after he had already got her” (199-200).
The languages which Sutpen learns in Haiti, then, are caught up in his scheming for power, but
they also undermine it. In the Haitian Creole which Sutpen speaks, which historically emerged
through the capacities of the African enslaved to form bonds of solidarity in communication,
exists the continuous possibility of resistance and emancipation.
Any explication of Mr. Compson’s musings on how language “does not explain” is also
incomplete without a consideration of the framing of General Compson’s own theory of
language by Sutpen’s capacity for learning Creole:
And he overseeing it, riding peacefully about on his house while he learned the language
(that meagre and fragile thread, Grandfather said, by which the little surface corners and
edges of men’s secret and solitary lives may be joined for an instant now and then before
sinking back into the darkness where the spirit cried for the first time and was not heard
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and will cry for the last time and not be heard then either), not knowing that what he
rode upon was a volcano (AA 202)
As a “meagre and fragile thread,” language seems to possess the capacity to fleetingly bond its
speakers together—a symbolic structure—but which is always undergirded by a primal
“darkness”—that which is negated and unavailable for signification: the Real. The fragility of
language does not gainsay its affordance of power, but it does leave those (like Sutpen) who
would invest in its absolute ability to “subdue” still vulnerable to emancipatory possibility
because language can also provide the means by which to find solidarity in what is absent, and
in this negativity find bonds of equality and resistance. The verbosity of Sutpen’s narrative, then,
constitutes an effort to stave off this possibility as well as an attempt by Faulkner to mediate an
inchoate sense of the lack immanent to language: “Language speaks voluminously in positive
statements, but it also copiously speaks of its own lack of self-sufficiency, its inability to speak
the whole unvarnished truth directly and without recourse to further, exegetical speech. Some
elision or negation of its powers writes itself in language as the lack of metalanguage” (Copjec
9). Crucially, learning Creole does not allow Sutpen to know “that what he rode upon was a
volcano” (AA 202). Language does not speak the whole truth, the truth of the enslaved’s
revolutionary agency and of Haitian history. Neither is there a metalanguage which can
positively signify this truth—hence the unthinkability both of the volcano and its eruption.
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The Signifier and the Dialectic of Revolution
As Azérad writes, “Languages (aural, gestural, and written) are the most purloined of all ‘letters’
in Absalom” (174). Indeed, the position of the ‘letters’ available to the narrators within the
symbolic structure of the novel determines their (in)ability to makes sense of Sutpen’s narrative,
even as this effort in turn proves incapable of conclusively signifying “the South” and how
exactly Sutpen embodies its failure. Because Quentin views “the South,” a master signifier, as a
transcendental signifier—or the point of ultimate meaning beyond signification—he is tortured
by the prospect of never escaping from it. Quentin from the beginning contains “backwardlooking ghosts” and “defeated names” (AA 7), yet by the end he has still not managed to
negotiate an escape from these signs of Southern history. As if to press the issue to him in a highly
tendentious way, in the last lines of the novel Shreve asks him why he “hates” the South: “‘I dont
hate it,’ Quentin said, quickly, at once, immediately; ‘I dont hate it,’ he said. I dont hate it he
thought, panting in the cold air, the iron New England dark: I dont. I dont! I dont hate it! I dont
hate it!” (303). Delimiting the novel at this point accomplishes several things at once: first, the
febrile despair which ultimately drives Quentin to suicide (known to readers of The Sound and
the Fury) is not only engendered by his unconsummated incestuous desire for Caddy, his sister,
but is also at least compounded by his inability to reconcile himself to the impossibility of
signification vis-à-vis the South, its history, and his own embodiment of both no matter where
he goes (even Harvard); second, the form of this passage—its repetition, transition from
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statement to exclamation, and turn from external to internal monologue—shows an insistent
disavowal that, via its increase in intensity, exemplifies the noncoincidence of what Quentin says
with what he means or unconsciously knows, which in turn epitomizes the noncoincidence, or
lack, which constitutes signification itself; and, finally, as a limit to the novel which partially
constitutes its totality, this passage sutures the narrative failure (to signify the South through
Sutpen) to a failure to avow that which is repressed within “the South.” By claiming to not hate
the South, Quentin continues to repress the constitutive absences within this signifier’s history.
To put it in Freudian terms, he cannot work through it.
Chief among these constitutive absences is, of course, the Haitian Revolution. As a
successful revolution of enslaved Black people against the white slaveholders, it embodies
everything that the South needed to repress within itself. In Absalom, Absalom! this repression
takes the form of Sutpen’s suppression of the revolution local to the Haitan plantation which
he oversees, a reversal of an ideologically-mediated version of the historical event. Yet what
Sutpen, Faulkner, and many critics also overlook is that the failure of this attempt, this particular
negation at work within the text, does not fully eliminate the possibility of revolution within
the totality constituted by the text. Sutpen leaves Haiti, as do Eulalia and Charles Bon, and—in
another flourish of imperial “innocence”—no one takes interest in what happens there after they
depart. The historical Haitian Revolution had many precursors, many attempted uprisings that
failed. The revolutions of Mackandal, Ogé, and Boukman did not succeed, and, in a very specific
sense, neither did Toussaint’s—he was too trusting of the French and too aloof from the masses
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themselves to contend for Haiti’s absolute independence as a free nation-state in the way
Dessalines did.52 Nevertheless, all of these failures are canceled (Aufheben) and present in the
ultimate success of the Haitian Revolution. This dialectical logic of revolution is the very same
which Rosa Luxemburg expresses in “Reform or Revolution” in her refutation of idea that the
revolution of the proletariat must wait for the correct “objective conditions” to arrive:
it will be impossible to avoid the ‘premature’ conquest of state power by the proletariat
precisely because these ‘premature’ attacks of the proletariat constitute a factor, and
indeed a very important factor, creating the political conditions of the final victory. In
the course of the political crisis accompanying its seizure of power, in the course of the
long and stubborn struggles, the proletariat will acquire the degree of political maturity
permitting it to obtain in time a definitive victory of the revolution. Thus these
‘premature’ attacks of the proletariat against the state power are in themselves important
historic factors helping to provoke and determine the point of the definite victory. (96)
Premature and failed revolutions are the conditions of possibility for a successful one. In
Absalom, Absalom! Sutpen does benefit directly from his ostensible defiance of such a
“premature” attempt on the part of the enslaved. However, Sutpen’s suppression of the
revolution is not, and could never be, a permanent negation of the possibility of emancipatory
struggle on both diegetic and extradiegetic planes. Faulkner’s novel cannot eliminate the
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92

dialectical movement of revolution itself; indeed, the failure to represent the Haitian Revolution
as an event is not a failure to represent it as a process. If the howl of Jim Bond—direct descendant
of the Haitian Creole Charles Bon—the wordless cry accompanying the conflagration of
Sutpen’s plantation house, signifies as anything, perhaps it is as “the vocal expression of nominal
freedom, the hope and the frustration of inhabiting in time and place the line between
enslavement and emancipation” (Abdur-Rahman 56). Thus, when Shreve comments ironically
that “the Jim Bonds are going to conquer the western hemisphere” (AA 302), he certainly means
more than he says or knows.
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